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I. INTRODUCTION
What should the Supreme Court of the United States do when a plain-
tiff tries to sue a defendant under a federal statute that provides no private 
remedy for damages? This is the question at the heart of all cases dealing 
with so-called implied rights of action. This Comment addresses the topic 
of implied cause of action. The term “implied cause of action” does not 
have a clear meaning, but generally refers to a federal cause of action based 
on a federal statute1 that does not expressly provide for a remedy.2 When 
the Supreme Court implies a cause of action into a federal statute, the Court 
1
 This Comment will not discuss in detail implication cases based on the Constitution. This is 
because the Supreme Court is generally more willing to find an implied cause of action under the Con-
stitution than under a statute because constitutional implication tends to protect more fully constitutional 
rights than statutory implication can protect statutory rights. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396-97 (1971) (holding an implied cause of action 
for violations of the Fourth Amendment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 242-44 (1979) (holding an 
implied cause of action for violations of the Fifth Amendment); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-21 
(1980) (holding an implied cause of action under the Eighth Amendment). 
2
 This is a paraphrase of Justice Powell’s definition: “the right of a private party to seek judicial 
relief from injuries caused by another's violation of a legal requirement. In the context of legislation 
enacted by Congress, the legal requirement involved is a statutory duty.” Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 
441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979). This Comment makes use of both the terms “implied cause of action” and 
“implication” to mean this situation. 
2006] A New Test for Congressional Intent Under Cort v. Ash 241
treats that action as if it were a literal provision of the statute.3 The question 
of jurisdiction to hear an implied cause of action case, however, is outside 
the scope of this Comment.4
The starting place is the leading Supreme Court case of Cort v. Ash,5
when the Supreme Court first defined a four-factor approach to implied 
causes of action. In doing so, it is important to know a brief history of im-
plication. Each of the four factors will be discussed to understand what they 
mean. In addition, leading cases that changed this analysis will be analyzed. 
The four factors will then be examined as they currently stand in varying 
degrees of importance. 
This Comment will next address two of the leading schools of inter-
pretation on implication cases. One approach is that of Justice Scalia, who 
argues that the Court should rarely, if ever, use congressional intent in in-
terpreting whether to imply a cause of action. On the other side of the issue 
are the contextualists who argue that even actual congressional intent is 
unnecessary if Supreme Court doctrines at the time of the creation of the 
statute often implied causes of action. Finding neither approach practical or 
acceptable, this Comment offers a third option: that the Supreme Court 
should imply causes of action only when Congress actually considered the 
3
 David L. Heinemann, Note, Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934, 1986 DUKE L.J. 548, 567-68 (1986). This also means that all defenses and requirements to 
reach federal court that the Court traditionally would grant under express causes of action also exist 
when the Court implies a private right of action. See Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 639 (1988) (granting 
an in pari delicto defense for implied securities actions). See generally Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988) (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding that the implied cause of 
action under federal patent law lacked merit and therefore the case did not “arise under” federal law). 
4
 Subject matter jurisdiction for an implied cause of action is derivative of whether the cause of 
action is implied. If the court does imply a cause of action, then there necessarily is federal question 
subject matter jurisdiction. If the court does not imply a cause of action, then there is no federal question 
subject matter jurisdiction based on the statute. 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4004.3 (2d ed. 1987). There is some controversy, however, over 
the constitutional appropriateness of this kind of bootstrapping of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Michael J. Kaufman, Mending the Weathered Jurisdictional Fences in the Supreme Court’s Securities 
Fraud Decisions, 49 SMU L. REV. 159, 193-99 (1996) (“When a federal court creates a private right of 
action for the violation of a federal statute, it engages in an unconstitutional expansion of its limited 
subject-matter jurisdiction.”); John T. Cross, The Constitutional Federal Question in the Lower Courts 
of the United States and Canada, 17 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 143, 156 (1993) (arguing that 
“implying a cause of action from a statute undoubtedly involves a certain degree of judicial activism” 
and that “federal courts in the United States . . . regularly take this analysis”). Part of the concern over 
this dichotomy is that many enterprising litigants may attempt to argue for an implied cause of action 
from a statute which addresses jurisdictional concerns. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2754 
(2004).
Additionally, the exercise of personal jurisdiction based on implied causes of action appears to ex-
tend just as far, and no further, than an expressed statutory right. Omni Capital Int’l v. Rudolf Wolff & 
Co., 484 U.S. 97, 108 (1987). 
5 Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).     
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issue when creating the statute. As additional support for the direction of 
the Court towards implied causes of action, an appendix is provided.6
II. CORT V. ASH AND THE FIRST IMPLICATION CASES
The Supreme Court’s approach to implied causes of action did not it-
self begin with the signal case of Cort v. Ash.7 Rather, that important deci-
sion synthesized several different approaches to implied causes of action 
and created a singular test. Due to this, the landmark case of Cort is a focal 
point of this Comment. What remained to be decided after Cort was not 
how to imply causes of action, but what controlled in that determination. 
A. The Cort Decision
Cort involved the Bethlehem Steel Corporation allegedly violating a 
criminal statute,8 which barred a corporation from using general corporate 
funds to pay for political advertisements during the presidential campaign 
of 1972.9 The Court wasted little time, however, on the question of whether 
a criminal statute could result in civil remedies10 and remained fixed on the 
more memorable question of whether a statute that did not explicitly create 
a cause of action could create one implicitly.11
A unanimous Court established a four-factor test based on old case law 
to determine whether a private suit could be found under the statute:12
First, is the plaintiff “one of the class for whose especial benefit the 
statute was enacted,” . . . that is, does the statute create a federal right 
in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative 
intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny 
one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legisla-
6
 See appendix, infra. For easier reference, the appendix of cases is listed in reverse chronologi-
cal order. For purposes of simplification, concurring Justices who join the majority opinion are placed 
under the heading of “majority” with a star by their name. This list consists of a brief and recent history 
of implication cases since 1979. 
The appendix is meant to be a list of cases since 1979 where the Supreme Court has addressed the 
issue of whether a statute included an implied cause of action and is not meant to be an exhaustive list of 
all cases involving implication in other respects. Hence, cases where the Court has extended implied 
causes of action will be addressed in this Comment, but will not be listed in the appendix. E.g. Cent. 
Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994); Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis 
& Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991). As the appendix shows, the cases have shown a clear 
trend towards less implication over the years. 
7
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
8
 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970). 
9
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 70. 
10
 Id. at 79 (holding that “provision of a criminal penalty does not necessarily preclude implica-
tion of a private cause of action for damages”). 
11
 Id. at 68 (noting that “the principal issue presented for decision is whether a private cause of 
action for damages against corporate directors is to be implied . . . .”). 
12
 Id. at 78. 
2006] A New Test for Congressional Intent Under Cort v. Ash 243
tive scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff? And finally, is 
the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area 
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to 
infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?13
Going systematically, the Court noted that the plaintiff failed to meet 
any of the factors. In examining the statute for rights, the Supreme Court 
found that “there was nothing more than a bare criminal statute, with abso-
lutely no indication that civil enforcement of any kind was available to any-
one.”
14
 Second, the Court pointed out that legislative history of Congress in 
this case “demonstrated that the protection of ordinary stockholders was at 
best a secondary concern.”15 The Court similarly found that the purposes of 
the statute would not be served because “the remedy sought would not aid 
the primary congressional goal” of preventing corporate influence in poli-
tics.16 Finally, the Court pointed out that state law already well regulated the 
issue in question and that several potential causes of action and remedies 
existed there.17 The Supreme Court therefore found that when the factors 
were added together in this case, the statute did not lend itself to an implied 
cause of action. 
B. The Origins of Cort 
The phenomenon of the Court implying a cause of action has a long 
history.18 Most scholars19 point out that the first case where the Court en-
gaged in an implication analysis was in Texas & Pacific Railway v. Rigsby20
where the Court engaged in a form of negligence per se combined with a 
determination of whether the injured party was of a class protected by the 
13
 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
14
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 80. 
15
 Id. at 81. As if to reiterate the point more clearly, the Court later exclaimed “there is no indica-
tion whatever in the legislative history of § 610 which suggests a congressional intention to vest in 
corporate shareholders a federal right to damages for violation of § 610.” Id. at 82. 
16
 Id. at 84. 
17
 Id. (“In addition to the ultra vires action pressed here, the use of corporate funds in violation of 
federal law may, under the law of some States, give rise to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary 
duty.”) (internal footnotes omitted). 
18
 Some argue that the Court had been implying causes of action from as far back as 1803, but 
had been doing so under a rationale different from Cort. Susan Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent 
in Determining the Existence of Implied Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861, 864 (1996); see 
also Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L.
REV. 67, 68 (2001) (arguing that courts until the 1970s always implied causes of action to remedy viola-
tions of a statutory right).  
19
 E.g., Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under §1983: The 
Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 
291(1996); Bruce A. Boyer, Note, Howard v. Pierce: Implied Causes of Action and the Ongoing Vitality 
of Cort v. Ash, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 722, 733 (1985); Christopher L. Sagers, Note, An Implied Cause of 
Action Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1381, 1386 (1997). 
20
 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916). 
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statute.
21
 This approach was highly similar to that of a state court employ-
ing general common law principles.22 It therefore came as little surprise that 
the Court’s pre-Cort presumption was to imply causes of action. This be-
came problematic when the Court began to do away with the idea of a gen-
eral federal common law.23 While the presumption in favor of implication 
could no longer remain tethered to theories of negligence per se, the Court 
would not adjust this presumption until Cort.24
This beginning led the Court to avoid engaging in this issue until 1964 
in J. I. Case Co. v. Borak.25 The allegation in Borak was that the J. I. Case 
Company, in attempting to merge with another corporation, violated their 
fiduciary duties to the shareholders and made misrepresentations when it 
sent out its proxy solicitations26 to the shareholders.27 The Court, by exam-
ining Section 14(a) in conjunction with Section 27 of the statute in ques-
tion28 thought it “clear that private parties have a right under Section 27 to 
bring suit for violation of Section 14(a) of the Act.”29 The Court added that 
the statute, by allowing for a suit “brought to enforce any liability or 
duty,”30 created enough of an implication for the statute to contain an im-
21
 Id. at 39 (“A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in 
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover dam-
ages from the party in default is implied.”). Not all Supreme Court Justices have agreed that Rigsby
began implied causes of action, however. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting) (com-
menting that Rigsby followed traditional common law approach to the issue “and cannot be taken as 
authority for the judicial creation of a cause of action not legislated by Congress”). 
22
 E.g., Elder v. E. I. Due Pont de Nemours & Co., 479 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Ala. 1985); Crosby v. 
Hummell, 63 P.3d 1022, 1025 (Alaska 2003); Spates v. Dameron Hospital Assn., 114 Cal. App. 4th 208, 
218 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2003). 
23
 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 
560, 568 (1979) (holding that the plaintiff’s “argument in favor of implication of a private right of action 
based on tort principles, therefore, is entirely misplaced”). But see Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 
U.S. 1083, 1110 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that “I recognize that the Court’s disallowance . . 
. of an action for misrepresentation of belief is entirely contrary to the modern law of torts . . . .”). 
24
 See generally J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (implying a cause of action based on 
different criteria). 
25
 Id.
26
 A proxy solicitation is a solicitation sent out at the corporation’s expense for the shareholders to 
vote on a matter deemed to be of corporate business. THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM,
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, 576-707 (2003) [hereinafter HAZEN &
MARKHAM].  Misrepresentation of proxy materials a violation of the Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C.S. 
§ 78n(a) (1934).  
27
 Borak, 377 U.S. at 429-30. 
28
 The pertinent text of Section 27 is as follows: 
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory or other place 
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of violations of 
this title or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in equity and actions at law 
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder 
. . . . 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1934). 
29
 Borak, 377 U.S. at 426-27. 
30
 15 U.S.C. § 78aa. 
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plied cause of action.31 The Supreme Court appeared to latch onto this 
“duty” creating language. The Court thus began the debate on whether du-
ties amounted to rights under the later Cort analysis.  
After Borak, the Court began to imply causes of action quite fre-
quently.32 Cort therefore, became the seminal case not because it changed 
the law of implied causes of action, but because it delineated the four fac-
tors that the Court implicitly relied on in determining whether to imply a 
cause of action.33 Notably, the Court, while establishing the test that argua-
bly made implied causes of action far easier to find,34 did not find one in 
this case. 
C.    The Cort Factors in Action 
1.    First Factor: Rights Conferred to the Plaintiff by Statute 
The first factor of Cort is whether the plaintiff is part of an especial 
class who benefits from the statute and therefore creates a federal right. It is 
not simply enough that the word “right” is in the statute.35 Additionally, the 
idea of an “especially harmed” class does not automatically confer a right.36
31
 Borak, 377 U.S. at 427. 
32
 See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (finding an implied 
cause of action under the Securities Act of 1934); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) 
(finding an implied cause of action under the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 
401 (1970) (finding an implied right of action in Social Security Act of 1935, as amended in 1967); 
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (finding an implied cause of action under 
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396-97 (finding an implied cause of 
action under the Fourth Amendment); Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of 
Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 845 (2002) (“Between 1964 and 1975, the Supreme 
Court in several cases found an implied private cause of action under various regulatory statutes.”). But 
see National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass’n. of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974) (declin-
ing to find an implied cause of action after thorough examination of legislative intent).  
33
 E.g., Charity Scott, A Broker-Dealer’s Civil Liability to Investors for Fraud: An Implied Private 
Right of Action Under Section 15(C)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 IND. L.J. 687, 701 
(1988); Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in 
the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987); Boyer, supra note 19, at 734. But see Key, supra note 
19, at 295 (noting that commentators disagree as to whether Cort represented a departure from previous 
decisions); Michael A. Mazzuchi, Note, Section 1983 and Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies, 
and Realism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1062, 1074 (1992). 
34
 See, e.g., Mank, supra note 32, at 845 (“Although the Supreme Court probably intended Cort's 
four-part test to limit judicial implication of private rights of action, in the four years after Cort, twenty 
federal appellate decisions implied private actions from federal statutes.”). 
35
 Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981) (“In expounding a statute, 
we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the 
whole law, and to its object and policy.”) (internal quotes omitted). 
36
 California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 294 (1981) (“[S]uch a definition of ‘especial’ benefici-
ary makes this factor meaningless. Under this view, a victim of any crime would be deemed an especial 
beneficiary of the criminal statute’s proscription. Cort did not adopt such a broad-gauge approach.”). 
127
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To some extent, this became a threshold issue.37 In fact, the Court, in 
Cort v. Ash itself noted specifically that the plaintiff had failed to meet this 
factor and therefore implication would likely be improper.38 This factor was 
nothing new. The Supreme Court was merely relying on portions of doc-
trine already laid out in earlier decisions to support individuals whose statu-
tory rights were injured.39 In fact, this factor appears to be similar to state 
common law approaches to negligence per se.40
Some have pointed out that this factor effectively asks whether Con-
gress has bestowed specific substantive rights on an identifiable class of 
persons and whether supporting that right with a right to private suit is ap-
propriate.41 Justice Stevens, for one, views this factor to be a paramount 
concern in the determination of whether a private cause of action exists.42
Some have argued that this factor, combined with the second factor, has 
been the Court’s best effort to find the ultimate legislative intent.43 The fac-
tor therefore changed from asking whether congressional intent existed to 
bestow a plaintiff some statutorily granted right, to whether the statute 
granted a right from which the Court could infer a congressional intent to 
imply a cause of action.44
A prime example of this factor at work is that of securities fraud 
cases.
45
 Indeed, entire sections of casebooks have been devoted to the study 
37
 Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283-84 (2002) (holding that “we must first determine 
whether Congress intended to create a federal right”); Harvey R. Boller, Unlawful Treatment of the 
Handicapped by Federal Contractors and an Implied Private Cause of Action: Shall Silence Reign?, 33 
HASTINGS L.J. 1293, 1301 (1982). 
38
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 79. 
39
 See Sagers, supra note 19, at 1395 (complaining that the first factor “is merely a restatement of 
the Rigsby standard”). “In fact, for the first factor the Court directly cited Rigsby.” Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 
(citing Rigsby). 
40
 For example, in Elder v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Alabama Supreme Court held 
that negligence per se requires inter alia that  “the trial judge must determine as a matter of law that the 
statute was enacted to protect a class of persons which includes the litigant seeking to assert the [state] 
statute.” 479 So. 2d at 1248 (1985). This is highly similar to the Cort factor of asking whether the fed-
eral statute is one that benefits [or protects] a special class of citizens, including the litigant. Cort, 422 
U.S. at 79. 
41
 Boyer, supra note 19, at 732. 
42
 See infra, note 155 and accompanying text for a discussion of the value of rights analysis as 
Justice Stevens understands it. 
43
 Stabile, supra note 18, at 867. 
44
 Scott, supra note 33, at 706. 
45
 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 171 (“This case concerns the most familiar private cause of action: one 
we have found to be implied by § 10(b), the general antifraud provision of the [Securities and Exchange 
Act].”). Scott, supra note 33, at 707 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly announced that ‘[d]efrauded 
investors are among the very individuals Congress sought to protect in the securities laws.’”). This, 
however, does not mean that implied causes of action exist only in the field of securities law. See Uni-
versities Research Ass’n, Inc. v. Contu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981) (examining the question of whether a right 
was conferred under the statute in determining whether a private right of action should be granted); see 
also appendix. 
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of implied causes of action within the area of securities laws.46 When the 
Court sees language in the statute that seems to create private rights, the 
implication of a private right of action appears to be more probable.47 When 
the Supreme Court examines the statute, however, and finds that the statute 
limits a wrong rather than creates a right, the Court will not generally imply 
a cause of action.48 In addition, “the provision giving rise to the asserted 
right must be couched in mandatory rather than precatory terms.”49
Some have pointed out that the word “right” is one of the most am-
biguous words in the field of law.50 Some have argued that a right is the 
result of a duty created by a statute.51 However, a right must be more than 
that for purposes of implied causes of action. Instead, the language of the 
statute must show intent to confer an actual right on the prospective plain-
tiff.   
2.    Second Factor: Legislative Intent 
The second factor of Cort—namely whether there is any indication of 
legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create a remedy or to deny one—
has been the subject of much controversy.52 The Supreme Court placed the 
understanding of this factor under National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. 
National Association of Railroad Passengers.53  This inquiry speculates that 
if Congress had specifically legislated on whether a cause of action should 
exist on this very matter, it would have granted one explicitly (or possibly 
would have refused to do so).54 The original Cort approach therefore meant 
46
 HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 26, at 576-707. 
47
 Boller, supra note 37, at 1303. 
48
 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (“Statutes that focus on the person regulated 
rather than the individuals protected create ‘no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular 
class of persons.’”) (internal citations omitted); see also Contu, 450 U.S. at 771 (holding that “there 
would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons where Congress, rather 
than drafting the legislation with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, instead has framed the 
statute simply as a general prohibition or a command to a federal agency”) (internal quotes omitted); see 
also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 92 (1981) (holding that the 
statutes in question were directed against employers rather than creating rights for those employers). 
49
 Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997). 
50
 Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?: Federal Agencies and the Creation of 
Individual Rights, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 613, 628 (2003) (quoting 4 Roscoe Pound, Jurisprudence § 118, at 
56 (1959)). 
51
 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913).  
52
 Before the Supreme Court gets to the question of congressional intent, however, it must first 
find that Congress had a legitimate source of power to legislate. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 15. 
53
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 77 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 414 U.S. at 458-60).  
54
 Gebser v. Lago Vista, 524 U.S. 274 (1998). Obviously, the question is not whether Congress 
would have legislated on the issue implicitly, since the entire inquiry of an implied cause of action 
presupposes that Congress may have legislated on the matter implicitly. 
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that an implied right of action could be found even in the absence of legisla-
tive intent to grant it.55
This hypothetical inquiry itself admittedly does change some common 
law presumptions in favor of implication, since the presumption must now 
be that there is no implied cause of action unless the legislative intent helps 
to establish otherwise while the old common law presumption was that a 
cause of action existed unless Congress acted otherwise.56
The question of legislative intent always begins with the language of 
the statute.57 In most contested cases, however, the statute itself is silent. 
This is only logical, of course, for if the language were clear on the issue 
the case would not rest on an implication theory in the first place. If the 
language of the statute does not result in clear finding of whether a cause of 
action exists, the Court will examine the legislative record for other aspects 
to determine legislative intent. 
The Supreme Court has commented that one way to find this legisla-
tive intent is to look at the statute contextually.58 The Court will look at the 
condition of the federal law on the subject at the time of the statute's pas-
sage to see what Congress would expect to happen when a private party 
attempted to enforce the statute. Inside of this inquiry into legislative intent, 
the Court has noted alternative remedies available to the plaintiff as relevant 
to the question.59 If the plaintiff has other alternatives, the Court will usu-
ally assume that Congress did not intend to add a private suit to them.60
3.    Third Factor: Consistent with the Legislative Scheme 
The third factor, whether an implied cause of action is “consistent with 
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy 
for the plaintiff,”61 means that the Supreme Court will examine the purposes 
of the statute and the remedies offered by Congress to determine if granting 
private actions would support or hinder those purposes.62 The Court re-
cently elaborated on this factor to point out that “[a] private remedy should 
55
 Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 
1423 (2001) (arguing that although the Cort factors “included congressional intent, courts remained free 
in theory to recognize an implied right of action even in the absence of legislative intent to grant one”). 
56
 Scott, supra note 33, at 711; see also Clark, supra note 55, at 1424 (“The result of the Court’s 
current approach ‘has been to reverse the presumption of the earliest implication cases’ . . . .’”). 
57
 Transamerica Mortgage Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979) 
58
 Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins., 508 U.S. 286 (1993). 
59
 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). 
60
 Id.
61
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
62
 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 573 (resting in part on the fact that “[t]here is evidence to support the 
view that [the statute] was intended to provide the exclusive remedy . . . ”). See generally Borak, 377 
U.S. at 431 (holding that the purpose of the statute in question led to the view that “broad remedial 
purposes” were to be included).  
2006] A New Test for Congressional Intent Under Cort v. Ash 249
not be implied if it would frustrate the underlying purpose of the legislative 
scheme. On the other hand, when that remedy is necessary or at least help-
ful to the accomplishment of the statutory purpose, the Court is decidedly 
receptive to its implication under the statute.”63
One commentator views this factor as a policy determination by the 
Court to determine whether providing a private remedy would be fair under 
the statute.64 This would appear to make this issue a hybrid between general 
policy determinations (which would encompass principles of common law 
jurisprudence) and a pure examination of congressional intent.65 As such, 
the Court’s determination of purpose appears to begin and end at an analy-
sis of remedies provided by the statute.66
4.    Fourth Factor: State Law 
The fourth factor of Cort v. Ash is whether the cause of action is one 
traditionally relegated to state law that is the concern of the states, so that it 
would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based on implication of a 
federal statute.67 This factor has obliged the Court to keep a wary eye to-
wards concerns for federalism.68 This comes from an assumption made by 
the Supreme Court that Congress is familiar with the background of settled 
law when it considers a statute and that Congress would not enact a law that 
would violate fundamental principles of federalism.69
This approach may be necessary from a policy perspective since a pro-
spective plaintiff suing under a theory of an implied cause of action is suing 
under that theory to get into federal court rather than under a state claim. 
However, many times when there is a federal statute violation, there are 
63
 Cannon, 411 U.S. at 703 (footnote omitted); see also Contu, 450 U.S. at 782-84 (holding that 
“the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme indicates that Congress did not intend to create the 
right of action asserted by respondent”); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 11 (noting the congressional purpose of 
the statute as one to “‘assist’ and financially ‘support’ various activities . . .” in ultimately determining 
that the statute does not contain a private right of action).  
64
 Stabile, supra note 18, at 868. 
65
 Contus, 450 U.S. at 777 (holding that the legislative intent behind the amended statute meant 
that “[t]o imply a private right of action here would be to defeat each of these congressional objec-
tives”). 
66
 E.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 539-41 (1984) (holding that the purposes 
of the statute were to have the Securities and Exchange Commission address advisor’s fees rather than 
allow for investment companies to litigate privately). This provision of remedies, however, might be 
analyzed under either the second factor (by finding that the specification of some remedies precludes all 
others) or the first factor (as an examination that remedies provided in the statute specify who has the 
rights needed to be protected). 
67
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78; see also Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 30-31 (holding that the statute in question 
did not constitute an area traditionally relegated to state law and therefore denial of the cause of action 
based on this factor was inappropriate). 
68
 Stabile, supra note 18, at 868. 
69
 See generally Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696 (“It is always appropriate to assume that our elected 
representatives, like other citizens, know the law . . . ”). 
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concurrent state statutes that also hold a potential claim.70 Part of this fac-
tor’s purpose aims towards the idea that it is better policy to encourage 
plaintiffs to take their possible federal grievance up through alternative 
means.
71
 This is in keeping with other Supreme Court doctrines to avoid 
issues that may implicate constitutional problems wherever possible.72
The Court in Cort cited Borak for this factor,73 a case where the issue 
was regulated both by federal as well as state securities laws.74 This does 
not mean that this factor is limited to those situations where a national in-
terest exists. Instead, this factor may be utilized effectively when the cause 
of action would make as much sense in federal court as in state courts. 
D.    Cort and Later Case Modifications
The Cort holding and the four factors garnered unanimous support 
among the members of the Court at the creation of this test.75 In later cases, 
when the Court began to use the Cort factors to imply causes of action, 
however, the Justices divided76 and the Court began to adjust the test itself. 
Commentators have argued that the discord among the Justices has not been 
about whether to use the Cort factors, but how much weight to place on 
each particular factor.77 Indeed, the varying weight that individual justices 
appear to place on each factor helps to explain Court decisions that appear 
to have adjusted the traditional Cort analysis.78 A modern trend appears to 
form showing that cases post-Cort place a greater emphasis on legislative 
intent than any other factor.79
70
 HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 26. 
71
 See Daily, 464 U.S. at 541 (holding that while a federal statute did exist to help regulate abuses 
against a corporation, “a corporation’s rights against its directors or third parties with whom it has con-
tracted are generally governed by state, not federal, law”). 
72
 E.g., Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (noting that “it is not the habit 
of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of 
the case”) (internal citations omitted). 
73
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
74
 Borak, 377 U.S. at 434. 
75
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 66. 
76
 Boyer, supra note 19, at 735. Some Justices had also begun to complain about the extension of 
the implication doctrine. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (complain-
ing that extension of the implication doctrine creates “a judicial oak which has grown from little more 
than a legislative acorn”). 
77
 See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571 (majority finding the inquiry to end at the question of legisla-
tive history; concurrence finding that the inquiry ends after an examination of rights and legislative 
history; dissent demanding an examination of all four factors); Boyer, supra note 19, at 734 (“Dissen-
sion has arisen not over the elaboration of a standard for measuring congressional intent, but rather over 
its application and the weight to be accorded to the various factors described in Cort.”). 
78
 Scott, supra note 33, at 702. 
79
 Peter J. Skalaban, Jr., Borak Breathes: Implying A Private Right of Action to Enforce SEC Rule 
14-A-8., 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1514, 1522 (1993). 
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1. The Cannon Adjustment
The first case to make a significant revision in the Court’s analysis of 
Cort was Cannon v. University of Chicago.80 In that case, the Court used all 
four factors in a thorough and methodical search81 to determine that a cause 
of action existed under Section 901 of Title IX of the Education Amend-
ments of 1972.82 In so implying a cause of action, the Court looked at the 
second factor and looked at it with a decidedly expansive view of legisla-
tive intent. The fact that the act was similar to other statutes passed at the 
same time83 and that Congress passed this statute in light of how lower 
courts were interpreting related language84 weighed heavily in the Supreme 
Court’s decision. 
Especially notable about Cannon is that the Court hinted that its ex-
amination of each factor weighed towards finding congressional intent to 
create a cause of action even after engaging in a detailed examination of 
each factor.85 Additionally, the Cannon Court pointed out that it would at 
times “take into account [the] contemporary legal context” of the time that 
the statute was passed to determine if there was an implied cause of ac-
tion.86 Admittedly, it is unclear as to whether Cannon itself represented a 
broad or narrow approach to the use of context,87 but it appears certain that 
the Court, after Cannon, appeared to take Cort’s four factors and treat them 
in a weighted fashion. 
Another major effect of Cannon was the resulting dissent by Justice 
Powell. Others concurred and dissented from the Court opinion, but no 
other side opinion has had as much of a lasting impression on implication 
jurisprudence.88 While isolated in his dissent,89 it seems apparent that Jus-
tice Powell’s concerns and his proffered approach of using legislative intent 
as the most important factor in discerning implied causes of action was des-
tined to become dominant among the Justices. 
80
 Cannon, 441 U.S. 677. 
81
 Boyer, supra note 19, at 735 (stating that Justice Steven’s Cort approach was “methodical”). 
82
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680. 
83
 Id. at 694. 
84
 Id. at 696-98. 
85
 Id. at 688 (noting that “before concluding that Congress intended to make a remedy available to 
a special class of litigants, a court must carefully analyze the four factors that Cort identifies as indica-
tive of such an intent”); see also Stabile, supra note 18, at 868 (“Although the Court analyzed each of 
the four Cort factors, it expressly viewed the four factors as the means through which congressional 
intent could be discerned.”). 
86
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-99. 
87
 Mank, supra note 32, at 848. 
88
 See, e.g., Key, supra note 19, at 297 (“Reasons for the Court's change in policy concerning 
implied causes of action can be gleaned from Justice Powell's dissenting opinion in Cannon v. Univ. of 
Chicago.”); Boyer, supra note 19, at 736 (“With Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon, the battle lines on 
the application of Cort were clearly drawn.”). 
89
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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2.    Touche Ross and Congressional Intent
The second case that meaningfully altered the Cort analysis was 
Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington where the Court refused to imply a cause 
of action in Section 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.90 In this 
case, the Court recast the Cort factors into a grand general inquiry into leg-
islative intent. The first major change that the Touche Ross Court brought to 
the Cort analysis was to hold explicitly that the four factors were not enti-
tled to equal weight.91 Additionally, the Court pointed out what commenta-
tors had begun to see all too clearly,92 namely that several of the Cort fac-
tors were better understood as being additional ways to discern legislative 
intent and not necessarily separate inquiries for their own sake.93 The 
Touche Ross Court therefore attempted to make this fact perfectly clear by 
pointing out that implied causes of action cases amounted to exercises in 
“statutory construction.”94
Some have pointed out that while the Touche Ross Court did empha-
size the second factor of legislative history as the most important and con-
trolling factor, the Court did not completely remove from analysis the other 
three factors. Additionally, critics argue that some semblance of the other 
three factors must still be present under Touche Ross if the Court is to find 
legislative intent necessary to warrant implication.95 For example, one 
90
 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 576. 
91
 Id. at 575. 
92
 E.g., Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Private Disparate Impact Suits, 34 GA. L. REV.
1155, 1230 (2000) (“Subsequent Supreme Court decisions further confirmed that the Cort factors are 
relevant only insofar as they serve as proxies for legislative intent.”); Stabile, supra note 18, at 869 (“In 
the wake of Cannon, Transamerica, and Touche Ross, the Supreme Court has either ignored the Cort
factors altogether, or used them only as evidence of congressional intent.”); Skalaban, supra note 79, at 
1526 (“The Court refused to explore the third Cort factor—whether an implied right is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the section—on the basis of a sweeping statement that effectively reformulated 
the four-step Cort test . . . .”); Boyer, supra note 19, at 727 (arguing that “an examination of the case law 
surrounding Cort demonstrates that the Supreme Court's mandate, indecisive at best, leaves room for a 
variety of factors to serve as interpretive tools”); Scott, supra note 33, at 706 (noting that “congressional 
intent [would] later . . . become the crucible of implication cases”); Paul E. Harner, Note, Implied Pri-
vate Rights of Action Under the United States Housing Act of 1937, 1987 DUKE L.J. 915, 920 (1987) 
(“The Supreme Court's strong emphasis on legislative intent also appeared in subsequent implied right 
of action cases.”); Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1076 (“In a series of statutory implied right of action 
cases after Cort, the congressional intent branch of the Cort inquiry increasingly displaced the compet-
ing notion that rights could be enforced without specific congressional intent.”); Steven M. Schuetze, 
Note, Thompson v. Thompson: The Jurisdictional Dilemma of Child Custody Cases Under the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 409, 422 (1989) (noting that “the four factors have been 
interpreted as merely relevant in determining whether a private remedy should be implied”). 
93
 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575-76 (noting that “the first three factors discussed in Cort—the 
language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose, are ones traditionally relied 
upon in determining legislative intent”). 
94
 Id. at 568; see also Northwest, 451 U.S. at 91 (holding that the Court’s “task is one of statutory 
construction”). 
95
 Boyer, supra note 19, at 738.  
2006] A New Test for Congressional Intent Under Cort v. Ash 253
commentator has pointed out that the first factor remains significant be-
cause of the growing importance of the second factor. 96
The Court, on occasion, has appeared to lean on a presumption that 
when some remedy is granted in the statute, legislative intent will not be 
found to support the implied cause of action because “when Congress 
wished to provide a private damages remedy, it knew how to do so and did 
so expressly.”97 To be sure, this is a view that appears more strongly held 
among specific Justices98 rather than among the Court generally.99 This po-
sition, however, is not without historical roots.100
3.    Transamerica and the Break Up of the First Two Factors
The third case to revise the Cort analysis was Transamerica Mortgage 
Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis.101 In that case, the Supreme Court held that the In-
vestment Advisers Act of 1940 did not have an implied cause of action 
based on violation of the Act’s anti-fraud provision.102 The Court accepted 
that Congress intended to create a class of people entitled to certain rights 
under the Act. 103 Nevertheless, the Court refused implication based on the 
distinction that legislative history supporting a cause of action and legisla-
tive intent to create a class of individuals were two different inquiries.104 In 
addition to this, the Supreme Court began a movement away from its view 
96
 Id. (noting that “[the Court’s] conclusion was based largely on a finding under the first factor 
that the statutory scheme was designed only to facilitate supervision of brokerage activities by the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission, not to benefit the plaintiff’s class”). 
97
 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 572; see also Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176 (“Congress knew how to 
impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so . . . . But it did not.”). 
98
 E.g., Carlson, 446 U.S. at 40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that “it is obvious that when 
Congress has wished to authorize federal courts to grant damages relief, it has known how to do so and 
has done so expressly”); Musick, 508 U.S. at 291 (Kennedy, J.) (pointing out that “[the Court has] asked 
whether Congress ‘expressly or by clear implication’ envisioned a contribution right to accompany the 
substantive damages right created or, failing that, whether Congress ‘intended courts to have the power 
to alter or supplement the remedies enacted’”) (internal citations omitted). 
99
 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining that “the main themes of the 
Court's opinion [include] that . . . Congress knows how to legislate. [This] proposition[] [is] unexcep-
tionable, but [is not a] reason to eliminate the private right of action against aiders and abettors of viola-
tions of § 10(b) and the Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC's) Rule 10b-5.”). 
100
 See Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 405 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“Con-
gress could not have been ignorant of the remedy of restitution. It knew how to give remedies it wished 
to confer. There was no need to add this one. Nor do I think it did so. It did not give it expressly. I do not 
think ‘other order’ in the context of [the statute] includes it.”); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 
U.S. 195, 204 (1962) (Black, J.) (“If Congress had intended that s 301 [sic] suits should also not be 
subject to the anti-injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it certainly seems likely that it 
would have made its intent known in this same express manner.”); Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19 (Stew-
art, J.) (holding that “it is an elemental canon of statutory construction that where a statute expressly 
provides a particular remedy or remedies, a court must be chary of reading others into it”). 
101
 Transamerica, 444 U.S. 11. 
102
 Id.
103
 Id. at 18-19. 
104
 Id.
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that finding a protected or designated class of citizens was one of the most 
accurate determinations105 and the analytical adjustment here could be 
greater than the Court itself appeared to admit. The Court consequently 
continued its primary focus on congressional intent while attempting to 
separate the factors further from any possible confusion amongst each 
other.106 The Court also appeared to rest part of its rationale on the fact that 
the statute, by expressly providing for some remedies, displayed an implicit 
legislative intent to deny others.107
Some have pointed out that the true novelty of Transamerica was the 
Court’s separation of whether a right existed from whether a remedy ex-
isted.108 Until that decision, the Court consistently seemed to hold that 
wherever it found a right, the other three factors would presumably fall into 
place in order to imply a cause of action.109 Transamerica’s value therefore 
may also lay in the modification to the traditional Cort test so that the in-
quiry into the second factor is restricted to indications of congressional in-
tent in the statute and accompanying legislative history rather than general 
examinations of congressional intent.110
4.    Thompson and the Changing Intent Standard
The fourth case where the Cort analysis appeared to break down was 
Thompson v. Thompson.111 The Supreme Court in this case ensured that the 
four Cort factors would receive varying weight by failing to explain each of 
the four factors specifically and instead resting almost exclusively on the 
question of congressional intent.112 Although a unanimous Court refused to 
imply a cause of action under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act,113
the Justices nevertheless divided on how to go about inferring congressional 
intent between the majority’s understanding and that of Justice Scalia. The 
Court as well as the concurrences appeared to agree with the view that the 
“focal point is Congress’s intent in enacting the statute”114 and that the four 
105
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690-91 n.13 (“Not surprisingly, the right- or duty-creating language of the 
statute has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of ac-
tion.”). 
106
 Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15. 
107
 Id. at 19. 
108
 Boyer, supra note 19, at 739. 
109
 See, e.g., Cort, 422 U.S. at 80 (finding no benefited class and equally finding no implied cause 
of action); Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693 (pointing out that “[u]nquestionably, . . .  the first of the four factors 
identified in Cort favors the implication of a private cause of  action” and equally finding an implied 
cause of action); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575 (failing to find a benefited class and equally failing to 
find an implied cause of action). 
110
 Boyer, supra note 19, at 740. 
111
 Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
112
 Schuetze, supra note 92, at 422. 
113
 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179. 
114
 Id. at 179. 
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factors of Cort have been used “as guides to discerning that intent.”115
However, the majority and the concurring members of the Court soon 
parted ways when the majority explained its understanding of congressional 
intent by explaining that “our focus on congressional intent does not mean 
that we require evidence that Members of Congress, in enacting the statute, 
actually had in mind the creation of a private cause of action.”116
Some have argued that these four cases taken together have effectively 
overruled Cort v. Ash117 despite the fact that the Supreme Court has never 
officially announced such a ruling. Notably, some of those who argue that 
Cort v. Ash has been overruled still are receptive to use the case in some, 
albeit limited, circumstances.118 Thus, some scholars remain adamant that 
Cort is no longer “good law”119 while others have accepted the continued 
use of the Cort analysis and have instead argued that these and other cases 
merely help to mold the factors into a more refined analysis.120
E. The New, Improved Cort Test
The Supreme Court appears content with a new and updated form of 
the Cort analysis. This approach has remained a mixture of the subjective 
and objective factors mentioned in Cort.121 The most important factor ap-
pears to be congressional intent as understood through legislative history. 
This does not mean that the search for especial classes given rights under 
the statute no longer remains a factor to consider. Nor, for that matter, has 
the question of general legislative purpose disappeared from the scene. It 
115
 Id. 
116
 Id.; see also id. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I am at a loss to imagine what congressional 
intent to create a private right of action might mean, if it does not mean that Congress had in mind the 
creation of a private right of action.”). 
117
 Id. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It could not be plainer that we effectively overruled the Cort 
v. Ash analysis in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. 
Lewis.”) (internal citations omitted). Justice O’Connor joined all parts of Scalia’s concurrence that 
include this rationale, but wrote separately to avoid joining Scalia’s entire rationale. Thompson, 484 U.S. 
at 188 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  
118
 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 77 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring) (point-
ing out that while implication cases have been less expansive, “causes of action that came into existence 
under the ancient regime should be limited by the same logic that gave them birth”). 
119
 Lambert, supra note 92, at 1231 (pointing out that “a number of lower courts have recognized 
this ‘effective overruling’ and have opined that the Court’s new emphasis exclusively on legislative 
intent results in a more stringent test for implied private rights of action”) (internal footnotes omitted); 
Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1078 (“While never overruled, Cort has become obsolete as the Court has 
focused on congressional intent to create judicial remedies.”); Zeigler, supra note 18, at 88 (“Cort be-
came like a ghost attempting to regain solid form, appearing relatively substantial in one case only to 
fade to transparency in the next.”). Lower courts have not ignored the implications of this critique. See,
e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1339 n.5 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Since the late 
1970’s, the Court has gradually receded from reliance on three of these four factors, focusing more and 
more exclusively on legislative intent alone.”). 
120
 Harner, supra note 92, at 923. 
121
 Cross, supra note 4, at 157. 
132
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does lend credence to the notion that abstract notions of federalism tend to 
carry little credible weight in implication cases though.  
1.    The Dominance of Congressional Intent 
The recent understanding of the Cort test has placed the question of 
congressional intent as the paramount and controlling factor.122 Under this 
approach, the Court has generally denied a cause of action unless there is 
clear evidence that Congress intended it to exist,123 usually not without a 
plain statement to that effect.124 While at least one Justice cites judicial def-
erence to Congress as the basis for this position,125 for some reason that 
approach has never had the intellectual force to inspire debate among 
scholars. Other Justices have relied on congressional intent as understood 
by the existence (or nonexistence) of alternative remedial provisions.126
Some have attempted to impress the idea that implication cases are a sub-
category of general statutory construction127 cases, but that rationale alone 
has not been terribly moving to the Court128 or scholars.129 Some scholars 
have argued for a theory of “rights equals remedies,” i.e., that the entire 
source of the Court’s jurisdictional power to hear an implication case comes 
from general power of judicial review,130 though the Supreme Court has 
122
 E.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 (limiting the inquiry “solely to determining whether Con-
gress intended to create the private right of action . . . ”). Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 (“The intent of 
Congress remains the ultimate issue, however, and ‘unless this congressional intent can be inferred from 
the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other source, the essential predicate for 
implication of a private remedy simply does not exist.’”); Suter v. Artist, 503 U.S. 347, 364 (1992) 
(“The most important inquiry here . . . is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy sought 
by the plaintiffs.”); see also Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1103 (noting that “the importance of enquiring 
specifically into intent to authorize a private cause of action became clear only later . . . in Touche Ross,
[and only then] was this intent accorded primacy among the considerations that might be thought to bear 
on any decisions to recognize a private remedy”); see also Cross, supra note 4, at 157 (“Although [the 
Supreme Court’s] more recent decisions still apply the four-part test, any evidence of Congressional 
intent is virtually controlling.”).  
123
 See Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1102 (“The rule that has emerged in the years since Borak and 
Mills came down is that recognition of any private right of action for violating a federal statute must 
ultimately rest on congressional intent to provide a private remedy.”). 
124
 Alexander Willscher, Comment, The Justiciability of Municipal Preemption Challenges to State 
Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 243, 265 (2000). 
125
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
126
 Id. at 724 (White, J., dissenting). 
127
 As mentioned in note 92 supra, this idea is not entirely without precedent.  
128
 Northwest, 451 U.S. 77 (stating that there is a distinction between statutory interpretation and 
implication: “the authority to construe a statute is fundamentally different from the authority to fashion a 
new rule or to provide a new remedy which Congress has decided not to adopt”). 
129
 Stabile, supra note 18, at 878 (noting that the approach of statutory construction “does not 
provide a persuasive rationale”); but see Skalaban, supra note 79, at 1532 (“The implication inquiry is a 
matter of statutory construction.”). 
130
 Stabile, supra note 18, at 882; Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1079-81; Davant, supra note 50, at 
629-30. This argument posits that Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), itself was an 
implied cause of action case. See Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 742 (1989) (Brennan, J., 
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declined this route.131 In a similar vein, others have argued that a narrow 
focus on congressional intent misses the point,132 though this argument ap-
pears to tilt at the Supreme Court windmills by longing for a return to a past 
view of implication that ignores current Court jurisprudence.133
The last attempt to harmonize various Court efforts at inferring con-
gressional intent was by Justice Marshall writing for the majority in Thomp-
son.
134
 While this helped to explain what the Court has looked at for infer-
ring legislative intent,135 it failed to provide a clear explanation of why the 
Court has focused almost exclusively on the subject. 
a) Justice Powell’s Separation of Powers Approach. Justice Powell 
may have articulated the best reason for implying a cause of action based 
on congressional intent in his previously noted side opinion of Cannon.136
Justice Powell’s argument rests on the view that when the Supreme Court 
starts to imply causes of action that were not expressly provided for by the 
statute, the Court violates basic separation of powers concerns because it 
implicitly takes upon itself jurisdiction of issues that have not necessarily 
been expressly granted by Congress.137  This argument posits that if a rem-
dissenting) (citing Marbury as an implied cause of action case). This argument is unpersuasive since 
Marshall himself bifurcated the issue of rights and remedies pointing out that while a right may exist 
and a remedy may be needed to affect that right, the power of the court remains a critical issue in dis-
cerning whether that ultimate right can be remedied. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 168 (where, after answering 
the question as to whether a right was granted to Marbury, the Court then examined whether the plaintiff 
was entitled to the remedy requested based (in part) on “the power of this court”). 
131
 E.g., Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983) (“Whether a litigant 
has a cause of action is ‘analytically distinct and prior to the question of what relief, if any, a litigant 
may be entitled to receive.’”); Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 284 (holding that “a plaintiff suing under an 
implied right of action still must show that the statute manifests an intent to create not just a private 
right but also a private remedy”) (internal quotations omitted). 
132
 Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1079 (“Requiring that Congress intend to allow parties to bring 
lawsuits to enforce their rights is like requiring that, in addition to intending to make a contract, parties 
to a contract also intend to allow themselves to be sued.”). This argument appears to miss the additional 
nuance that in the paradigm contract case, only two parties exist: the offeror and the offeree, whereas in 
the paradigm implication case, at least three parties exist: the plaintiff, the defendant, and the Congress 
that passed the statute without explicitly determining if a cause of action existed. 
133
 E.g., Tex. Indust., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (“Our focus, as it is 
in any case involving the implication of a right of action, is on the intent of Congress.”); Thompson, 484 
U.S. 174; Daily, 464 U.S. at 535-36 (“In evaluating such a claim, our focus must be on the intent of 
Congress when it enacted the statute in question.”). But see Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1115 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (expressing the view that the Court had declared “guerrilla 
warfare” against private rights of action under federal securities violations). 
134
 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 177. 
135
 Id. at 179. 
136
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Key, supra note 19, at 297 (noting 
that “[r]easons for the Court’s change in policy concerning implied causes of action can be gleaned from 
Justice Powell’s dissenting opinion in Cannon v. University of Chicago”). 
137
 Stabile, supra note 18, at 879. At least some scholars have argued that Justice Powell’s insis-
tence on congressional intent implicates more than just separation of powers but also federalism con-
cerns. E.g., Richard W. Creswell, The Separation of Powers Implication of Implied Rights of Action, 34
133
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edy should exist for this matter, it should come from Congress after hear-
ings, debate, and a legislative vote and not from judges, who are themselves 
not politically accountable.138 Additionally, implying causes of action with-
out requiring at least congressional intent to warrant implication runs the 
risk of contributing to legislative apathy. Worse still, Congress may become 
increasingly indifferent to its responsibilities on difficult matters that it 
should consider when passing new laws.139 Other Justices on the Court have 
articulated this position.140
Justice Powell’s separation of powers argument rests on a presumption 
that Congress, rather than the Court should be the one to decide ultimately 
and finally the possibility of a cause of action under the statute. It naturally 
follows that if any Cort factor were to carry a controlling weight, it should 
be the factor most directly related to the views of Congress on the matter: 
legislative history and legislative intent.141 The problem of a four-factor test 
with each factor having equal weight is that some of the factors “too easily 
may be used to deflect inquiry away from the intent of Congress, and to 
permit a court instead to substitute its own views as to the desirability of 
private enforcement.”142 For this reason, when the legislative history is 
clear, Justice Powell would follow the clear lead of Congress.143
b) Powell’s Critics.  Some scholars have argued that this approach to 
separation of powers is a bit too simplistic.144 They point out that separation 
MERCER L. REV. 973, 1003 (1983) (explaining “the obvious advantages of congressional decisions over 
court decisions in safeguarding the federalist nature of our government are that Congress is politically 
responsible and that the states are actually represented in the Senate”); Clark, supra note 55, at 1423 
(accord). 
138
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731. 
139
 Id. at 743 (Powell, J., dissenting) (noting that “[Cort] invites Congress to avoid resolution of 
the often controversial question whether a new regulatory statute should be enforced through private 
litigation”). 
140
 See, e.g., Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188-91 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that implying causes 
of action too freely would abridge the role of Congress); see also Bivens, 403 U.S. at 411-12 (Burger, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that separation of powers concerns may limit a court’s freedom to imply causes of 
action). 
141
 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Absent the most compelling evidence of 
affirmative congressional intent, a federal court should not infer a private cause of action.”). 
142
 Id. at 740. 
143
 See Miguel A. Vaca, Comment, Arbitrating Civil Rico and Implied Causes of Action Arising 
Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 455, 466 (1987) (“For 
Justice Powell, RICO’s title and legislative history clearly prevented the statute from applying to ‘gar-
den variety fraud,’ breach of contract cases, and ‘innocent businessmen’ whom Congress did not intend 
to reach with the statute.”). 
144
 Stabile, supra note 18, at 879 n.102 (“Justice Powell overstates the case. Judges may be im-
mune from the political process, but they are not immune to political influences and predispositions.”). 
Equally, one scholar has argued: 
[t]he extreme position taken by Justice Powell is amplified by the observation that the twenty fed-
eral appellate decisions he cites as unconstitutionally implying private rights of action are not 
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of powers concerns are more nuanced and that the Supreme Court has held 
as much.145 While this may be correct generally, it may neglect the point 
that the Court at times is satisfied enough with a “simplistic” understanding 
of constitutional doctrines when a more nuanced understanding would viti-
ate logic and the blueprint of the Constitution.146
Scholars additionally argue that Powell’s approach is internally incon-
sistent with his deference for Congressional will.147 They argue Powell’s 
refusal to imply a cause of action based on anything other than legislative 
intent is a false desire because Congress, if it believes that the Court has 
gone too far in implying the right into the statute, can always repeal that 
judicial interpretation by passing a clearer statute.148 Hence, because the 
Court is engaged in statutory interpretation and therefore can be overruled 
by statutory amendment, a misinterpretation does not rise to the level of a 
separation of powers problem.149
This argument is flawed in that it assumes that an action by the Court 
in an area that may violate constitutional issues should be permissible be-
cause they can be rectified by later Congressional action. In layman’s terms, 
it argues that two wrongs (Congressional inaction and an incorrect decision 
by the Supreme Court) can make a right because they can always be fixed 
products of the liberal Warren Court era. Rather, a substantial number of judges who decided these 
cases were appointed by Presidents Nixon and Ford. To argue that these strict constructionist 
judges, as many of them undoubtedly may fairly be categorized, are engaging in judicial legisla-
tion is an overstatement. In essence, Justice Powell's opinion suggests that he may be unfamiliar 
with the legislative process. He wants Congress to speak loudly and clearly whenever it seeks to 
effectuate a legislative objective. Although the implementation of this practice would be desirable, 
it is unrealistic. Legislation is often ambiguous, not because ambiguity is desirable, but because 
compromise, with the attendant loss of clarity, is required for passage of the legislation. Such a re-
sult may be unfortunate, but at least frequently in our system, it is the nature of the legislative 
process. 
Marc I. Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33, 40-
41 (1979). 
145
 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(noting that the Constitution “enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity”); see also Creswell, supra note 137, at 990-91; Stabile, supra note 18, at 879 (arguing that 
the Supreme Court has “long since abandoned a literal application of separation of powers, which would 
require a strict and absolute separation between the functions of the branches of the federal govern-
ment”). 
146
 See generally Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (denying 
Congress the ability of a single house veto because doing so would undermine the basic constitutional 
provisions of bicameralism and presentment); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (denying 
Congress the power to command the states to act in furtherance of newly passed federal gun laws as it 
would be a violation of principles of federalism). 
147
 See Boyer, supra note 19, at 749 (complaining that Justice Powell’s “fear is belied . . . by the 
fact that, given the remedial nature of the judicial role, elaboration of proper enforcement mechanisms 
by the courts reflects a sensible allocation of functions between the judiciary and legislature”) (internal 
quotes omitted). 
148
 Id. at 749-50. 
149
 Id.
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later. Ironically, this claim as well as the scholarly response to Justice Pow-
ell’s approach raises yet another constitution problem by asking Congress to 
decide who will be the final arbiter of the Constitutional issue of separation 
of powers in implied cause of action cases: the Supreme Court or Congress. 
Based on this inconsistency some scholars have gone so far as to make the 
claim that Justice Powell’s focus on Cort’s second factor overruled Mar-
bury v. Madison.150
Recent cases tend to reflect that Powell’s concerns resonate with the 
current Court.151 In fact, one could make the argument that current Justices’ 
concern with the Supreme Court’s Cort approach has not been that the 
analysis focuses on legislative intent. The concern has instead been that the 
inquiry into legislative intent has been so expansive that the legislative ma-
terials examined might not be terribly accurate indicators of Congress’s 
actual intent.152 The post-Cannon Court still examines implications based 
ostensively on all four factors;153 however, it appears increasingly apparent 
that an affirmative (or negative) finding on the issue of legislative history as 
it leads to congressional intent will tend to decide the issue prematurely.154
2.    The Search for Rights Remains Important 
This is not to imply that the first Cort factor is lacking all significance. 
In fact, this factor seems to remain important in determining many implica-
tion cases.155 For example, in Touche Ross, the Supreme Court did stop the 
examination of each Cort factor before it could be determined whether they 
150
 See supra note 130 for a discussion of Marbury.
151
 See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Assoc., 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990) (“The [Cort] test reflects a 
concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls the availability 
of remedies for violations of statutes.”); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560; Thompson, 484 U.S. 174; Musick,
508 U.S. at 291 (holding that Supreme Court precedents “teach that the creation of new rights ought to 
be left to legislatures, not courts”). Clark, supra note 55, at 1423 (“The Supreme Court’s current ap-
proach to implied private rights of action [responds] to these concerns.”). 
152
 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“We have said, to be sure, that the 
existence of intent may be inferred from various indicia; but that is worlds apart from today's Delphic 
pronouncement that intent is required but need not really exist.”). 
153
 See Harner, supra note 92, at 920 (noting that “the Court has declined to adopt Justice Powell’s 
suggested rejection of Cort in favor of exclusive reliance on express congressional intent”); Boyer, 
supra note 19, at 741 (arguing that at least as of 1985, “a majority of the Court, including Justices Ste-
vens, Brennan, Marshall, White, and Blackmun, continues to espouse Cort as the proper framework for 
determining congressional intent”). This view may no longer be the case. As the appendix shows, since 
1997, the majority of the Court has tilted against implications, implying a cause of action in just one 
case. In fact, a “head count” of the justices (counting concurrences as supportive of the majority) shows 
that for the last six years, at least four Justices—Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy—have consis-
tently refused to imply a cause of action while O’Connor has tended to join that position in most cases.  
154
 See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 576 (stopping the examination of the Cort factors after examining 
the first three factors). 
155
 E.g., Contu, 450 U.S. at 771-72, (“The Court consistently has found that Congress intended to 
create a cause of action ‘where the language of the statute explicitly [confers] a right directly on a class 
of persons that [includes] the plaintiff in the case.’”). 
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supported implication.156 Nevertheless, the Court appeared to weigh heavily 
the fact that the statute appeared to confer no right.157 Though the Court did 
lessen the importance of the rights factor, it did not remove it entirely from 
the equation.158 Even Justice Powell, the strongest proponent of elevating of 
the second factor above the other three, did not go so far as to excise the 
Cort analysis when given the chance.159
Scholars have additionally pointed out that the first factor remains im-
portant “because the Court must consider the purpose of a cause of action in 
deciding whether Congress intended to create it.”160 They argue that it is 
logically “almost impossible to answer the question of whether Congress 
intended to create a cause of action to enforce the right the plaintiff asserts 
without deciding whether the statute actually confers the right.”161 Others 
have pointed out, however, that either “the congressional intent or the rights 
element of Cort had to eventually predominate, because in mixing the two 
elements, Cort embraced a contradiction.”162
Faced with this choice, it appears that Court did minimize the impor-
tance of rights in relation to congressional intent.163 Recent cases suggest 
that this trend will continue.164 This result may yet beg the question of 
whether the Court simply avoids decisions based on a rights analysis and 
instead categorizes the issue as one of congressional intent. 
Even if the Court as a whole does not appear to engage in a rights 
analysis with the same gusto that it demonstrates towards legislative history 
and legislative intent, certainly individual Justices on the Court continue to 
do so. For example, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Cannon,
argued that when “it is clear that federal law has granted a class of persons 
certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private 
156
 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 575. 
157
 Id. at 569. 
158
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693 n.13. (noting that “the right- or duty-creating language of the statute 
has generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action . . . . 
This Court has never refused to imply a cause of action where the language of the statute explicitly 
conferred a right directly on a class of persons that included the plaintiff in the case.”). 
159
 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. 1, 4 (1981) (exam-
ining the statute under all four factors of the Cort test). 
160
 Zeigler, supra note 18, at 110. 
161
 Id. at 111; see also Davant, supra note 50, at 635 (arguing that “if regulations do not create 
rights, then the regulations cannot be privately enforced”). 
162
 Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1078. 
163
 Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 12 (denying plaintiff a private right of action for damages despite 
finding that the plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the statute in question); see also Contu, 450 U.S. 
at 771 (holding that “the fact that an enactment is designed to benefit a particular class does not end the 
inquiry; instead, it must also be asked whether the language of the statute indicates that Congress in-
tended that it be enforced through private litigation”). 
164
 E.g., Verizon Comm., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 124 S. Ct . 872, 878 (2004) 
(“That Congress created these duties, however, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that they 
can be enforced by means of a [cause of action].”). 
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cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such an action would 
be controlling.”165 Some scholars have retorted, however, that a straight-
forward reading of this language is uncalled for because it would be “so 
broad that a seemingly endless number of statutes would appear to confer a 
federal right on one class or another in satisfaction of the first of the four 
Cort tests.”166
Furthermore, the Court has held that implications do not require ex-
plicit grant of a right. Instead, the grant of some right to a class of citizens 
can be implicit in the language and structure of the statute.167 This approach 
tends to run the risk that the Court may portray what it is doing as an ex-
amination of the second factor.168
3.    Statutory Purpose Is Not Yet Dead 
In addition, the third factor is still in play, at least somewhat.169 Some 
have pointed out that courts must consider the question of whether implica-
tion is “consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to 
imply [a particular] remedy for the plaintiff”170 because implication cases, 
by definition, do not expressly provide a cause of action.171 Scholars mak-
ing this argument, based on extrapolations from Supreme Court prece-
dent,172 admittedly argue this point too far.173 Nevertheless, this contingent 
points out that unless the Court looks at the overall background statutory 
purpose, it denies itself the ability to answer whether Congress actually 
intended to imply a cause of action.174
Regardless of the correctness of that position, the Supreme Court ap-
pears to have moved further away from this factor in later cases.175 Thus, 
165
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 694 (quoting Cort, 422 U.S. at 82) (internal quotes omitted). 
166
 Boller, supra note 37, at 1304. 
167
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693. 
168
 Zeigler, supra note 18, at 112. 
169
 Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 384-85 (holding that the creation of an implied cause of action 
would further the purpose because “Congress viewed private litigation against exchanges as a valuable 
component of the self-regulation concept”); see also Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284 (“To guide the analysis, 
we generally examine the relevant statute to ensure that we do not fashion the scope of an implied right 
in a manner at odds with the statutory structure and purpose.”). 
170
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.  
171
 Zeigler, supra note 18, at 111. 
172
 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 (noting that “the legislative history of a statute that does not 
expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the question” 
of whether Congress actually had in mind creation of a private cause of action). 
173
 Zeigler, supra note 18, at 111 (arguing that implication cases by definition involve silence both 
on the statute’s surface as well as in the immediate legislative history). This understanding is not neces-
sarily true. It is entirely possible for the legislative history to be clear on the point while the statute is 
itself silent. Otherwise, there would be little need for the second factor of the Cort test itself. 
174
 Id. 
175
 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286-87 (“Without [congressional intent], a cause of action does not exist 
and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how com-
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while cases that rested on this issue have never been overruled,176 the Court 
has expressed the opinion that the current doctrine applies a “stricter stan-
dard.”177 Some scholars have even gone so far as to call this factor “irrele-
vant” if the first two factors are missing.178 This is especially enlightening 
when one notes that the question of congressional purpose was of some 
import at the time of Cort,179 perhaps implying that the change by the Court 
in cases such as Touche Ross had more to do with the rising value of con-
gressional intent rather than the decreasing value of statutory purpose.  
Some have also pointed out that the search for congressional purpose 
is really a continuation of the search for rights, unless somehow interrupted 
by the second factor during the search through legislative materials.180 Un-
der this logic, if a right appears conferred by the statute, the Court should 
examine whether it would serve the legislative purpose to imply a cause of 
action and only refuse implication if the Court finds contrary legislative 
intent.181 This concept appears to be an attempt to take the Cort factors and 
turn them into a conjunctive test where implication can only occur if the 
Supreme Court finds a right plus a purpose and only if legislative intent is 
silent or supportive. This would change the original factorial approach that 
the original Cort Court and subsequent Court cases have analyzed implica-
tion.182 This approach thus may go too far, but it logically follows that a 
strict understanding of the third factor should rarely lend independent guid-
ance as to whether a statute warrants implication.183 Most would agree that 
the most successful way to further the purpose of protecting a class’s rights 
patible with the statute.”). See, e.g., Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298 (holding that because the first two 
factors were not found, “it is unnecessary to inquire further to determine whether the purpose of the 
statute would be advanced by the judicial implication of a private action . . . ”); Texas Indus, 451 U.S. at 
639 (holding that the absence of the first two factors “makes examination of other factors unnecessary”); 
see also Thompson, 484 U.S. at 183 (holding that no implied right of action exists because it would be 
contrary  to “the purpose and context of legislative scheme to infer a private cause of action.”). 
176
 See infra note 244 and accompanying text for a discussion of the differing beliefs of the Jus-
tices on whether Cort has been overruled. 
177
 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 578. 
178
 Skalaban, supra note 79, at 1532. 
179
 See, e.g., Thompson, 484 U.S. at 177 (stating that “one of the chief purposes of the [statute in 
question] is to ‘avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State courts” rather than to allow 
for a private right of action); Sec. Investor Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421, 423 (1975) (“It is clear 
that the overall structure and purpose of the SIPC scheme are incompatible with such an implied right . . 
. Congress’s primary purpose in enacting the SIPA and creating the SIPC was, of course, the protection 
of investors. It does not follow, however, that an implied right of action by investors who deem them-
selves to be in need of the Act's protection, is either necessary to or indeed capable of furthering that 
purpose.”). 
180
 Scott, supra note 33, at 749. 
181
 Id.
182
 See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
183
 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 601 (holding that the purpose of the statutory scheme, seen through 
the congressional intent, required that administrative remedy be the sole remedy of the violation). 
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would be to allow private litigation under the statute.184 Thus, if left without 
any other indication of legislative intent on the matter, it would appear that 
the most logical recourse for the Court to assume that Congress did impli-
edly allow for such private suits.185
4. Federalism: The Cort Non-Factor
“The fourth factor focuses on whether to consider implication in light 
of whether the cause of action is a type traditionally relegated to state law 
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on a 
federal statute.”186 While useful as a factor during the early Cort years, this 
factor weakened in strength as corresponding concerns about federalism 
began to weaken.187 To be sure, this factor remains present, if only to de-
mark that Congress, presumably aware of the state of Constitutional law, 
would not pass a law that would violate federalism principles if it could. 
Even as concerns of federalism have returned to the forefront,188 there has 
not yet been a concurrent revival of the state law factor in deciding implica-
tion cases.189 There are even times when the Supreme Court has simply 
ignored this factor.190 More strikingly, in some cases the Court refused even 
to reach this factor of the Cort test.191 The most that one can say about this 
factor today is that it neither hinders nor helps implication in any significant 
way.192
184
 See Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (noting that civil litigation provided “a most effective weapon in the 
enforcement of the proxy requirements”); see also Bateman, Eichler, Hill & Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 
472 U.S. 299, 315-19 (1985) (noting the value of private suits to enforce federal law as having maxi-
mum deterrence value). 
185
 Scott, supra note 33, at 749-52. 
186
 Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. 
187
 That is not to say that concerns of federalism have eroded from the Court entirely, but merely 
that as the federal government began to engage in an increasing area of federal control, those areas 
considered traditionally regulated by the states have begun to dwindle.  
188
 E.g., Clark, supra note 55 (arguing that separation of powers is merely a protection of federal-
ism); Robert Knowles, Notes & Comments, Starbucks and the New Federalism: The Court’s Answer to 
Globalization, 95 NW. U.L. REV. 735, 739 (2001) (pointing out that “the Court's most recent decisions 
make it clear that the comprehensive revival of federalism will continue”). 
189
 Some have noted that the Court is beginning to swing towards a neo-classical understanding of 
federalism. Even if true, it has not led the Court to give greater credence to the fourth Cort factor as of 
this writing. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182-83. 
190
 E.g., Middlesex, 453 U.S. at 13-18; Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 639-40; Transamerica, 444 
U.S. at 15-25. 
191
 E.g., Cannon, 441 U.S. at 708-09; Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 298 (holding that since the first two 
factors were not found, “it is unnecessary to inquire further to determine . . . whether such a remedy is 
within the federal domain of interest”). 
192
 Scott, supra note 33, at 753. This factor may not be completely dead yet. In Thompson, the 
petitioner argued that implication would not violate jurisdictional concerns because the merits of the 
child custody case (a traditional state issue) itself would not be decided. The Supreme Court denied this 
argument based on the reasoning that if it found a private remedy, then a federal court could determine 
the case on the merits. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 187 n.4.  
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The basic problem with this factor is that most federal statutes for 
which plaintiffs seek implication involve inherently federal issues.193 For 
example, while state securities laws do exist, they simply do not compare in 
range and effect as the Securities Exchange Acts of 1933 and 1934.194 A 
survey of the last ten implied cause of action cases examined by the Court 
has revealed few issues where the state regulations, where they have regu-
lated, are of the same significance and reach as its federal counterpart.195
Indeed, many scholars appear to note this factor as a mere afterthought in 
respect to current Court analysis of Cort.196
At least one scholar has attempted to revive this factor, however, urg-
ing that it should remain as a viable issue for the Court to consider.197 In 
this understanding, concerns of federalism always remain a consideration 
while the corresponding issues of congressional intent remain weakened a 
bit.198 This argument attempts to simplify the inquiry somewhat to ask if the 
plaintiff would be able to sue under any applicable and viable theory of 
state law. For instance, if a potential cause of action would violate a federal 
law as well as state tort law, “courts should be particularly deferential to 
state law and state remedies.”199
III. IMPROVING THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT FACTOR
If one accepts that implied causes of action now turn mainly on the de-
termination of congressional intent, the inquiry must therefore focus on 
“how much” intent must exist before the action will lie. The Supreme Court 
has hinted but never quantified the amount of intent needed, but there are 
some clues about the quality of intent that needs to be in the legislative re-
cord. On this point, two extreme positions seem to have risen. The first is 
that of Justice Scalia, who has taken Justice Powell’s concerns towards im-
plication generally and has argued for the Court to discard the congressional 
193
 Even when the issue is not inherently federal, the Supreme Court has shown little compunction 
with interpreting the federal statute narrowly to avoid conflicting with the state law. See Pennhurst, 451 
U.S. at 30-31 (holding that the statute in question did not constitute an area traditionally relegated to 
state law and therefore denial of the cause of action based on this factor was inappropriate). 
194
 Borak, 377 U.S. at 426. 
195
 See appendix. 
196
 E.g., Lambert, supra note 92, at 1230 (pointing out that “the first three factors discussed in 
Cort—the language and focus of the statute, its legislative history, and its purpose . . . —are ones tradi-
tionally relied upon in determining legislative intent”); id. at 1232 (“A plaintiff may bring a private 
action, in the absence of express provision of such an action, only if he proves—from the legislative 
history, language or structure of the statute, or from the circumstances of the statute’s enactment—that 
Congress intended such private actions to be brought.”) (internal footnotes omitted); Scott, supra note 
33, at 753 (noting that “the significance or effect of demonstrating the federal nature of the right, and 
thereby satisfying the fourth Cort factor, is questionable under recent cases, however.”). 
197
 Stabile, supra note 18, at 907.  
198
 Id. at 903-08. 
199
 Id. at 906. 
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intent factor in favor of expressed intent, to be used only when the intent is 
unmistakable and clear.200 The second view has been that of scholars and 
(from time to time) some Justices who imply that actual congressional in-
tent itself can be entirely neutral or even non-existent and yet other factors 
may still lend understanding as to what Congress would want the Court to 
do.201 While the former argument seems to hold the stronger rationale, nei-
ther argument appears to be appealing pragmatically or theoretically for the 
Supreme Court. This Comment offers a third approach, namely asking the 
Court to require that some intent must be used in implication cases, but only 
when there is a sufficient objective indication in the legislative record that 
such intent, if found, would indicate clearly that the legislature intended a 
cause of action to be implied. 
A.    Scalia’s Approach 
Justice Scalia’s view on implied causes of action is to some extent 
simply an extension of Justice Powell’s earlier criticisms.202 Both appear to 
view the problem in terms of judicial encroachment on the traditionally 
congressional areas of lawmaking.203 The difference, however, is one of 
degree. Justice Powell argued that using all four parts of the Cort test is 
incorrect because doing so fails to focus properly on the statute and the 
intent of the statute.204 Justice Scalia’s approach responds that using any of 
the factors of Cort runs the risk of not being true to what the legislature 
enacted, regardless of their intent.205 Justice Scalia therefore appears to have 
developed a new corollary to Justice Powell’s approach.206 For that reason 
that Justice Powell’s initial concerns brought forth a relatively swift shift in 
200
 See Marc I. Steinberg & William A. Reece, The Supreme Court, Implied Rights of Action, and 
Proxy Regulation, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 67, 82 n.112 (1993) (arguing that acceptance of congressional intent 
still would not satisfy Justice Scalia’s approach). 
201
 See infra, notes 275-85 and accompanying text on contextualism. 
202
 Scott, supra note 33, at 714 n.115 (noting that Justice Scalia’s approach towards implied causes 
of action are “along [the] line” of Justice Powell); see also Glen Shu, Comment, Take a Second Look: 
Central Bank After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 539, 576 
n.198 (1996) (noting that Justice Powell has criticized implied causes of action and that “in particular, 
Justice Scalia has harshly criticized the Court's use of the implication doctrine . . . ”). 
203
 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 732 (Powell, J., dissenting); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188 (Scalia, J., con-
curring). 
204
 See Steinberg & Reece, supra note 200, at 82 n.112 (“Justice Scalia's disdain for the implica-
tion of private remedies reminds one of Justice Powell's vigorous dissent in Cannon.”) 
205
 Justice Scalia’s paradigm would find support in the Canadian approach to implied causes of 
action. See Cross, supra note 4, at 156 (“Canadian courts will not imply a cause of action from a federal 
statute.”). This is ironic given Justice Scalia’s disapproval of the use of international sources in deciding 
cases. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting 
that “we must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are expound-
ing”); Printz, 521 U.S. at 921 n.11 (noting that “comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of 
interpreting a Constitution”). 
206
 See Steinberg & Reece, supra note 200, at 82. 
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Supreme Court jurisprudence, it is at least possible to consider that the 
Court may move towards Justice Scalia’s corollary.207 Thus, a thorough 
understanding of his rationale and view is appropriate specifically as it per-
tains to the current Court understanding of legislative history and legislative 
intent. 
Justice Scalia has argued that the Court should stop implying causes of 
action.208 He argues this from the position that common law itself, while 
valuable when engaged in a common law issue, is inapplicable and poten-
tially violative of democratic principles when engaging in statutory inter-
pretation.209 Part of the reason has been his view that more and more of the 
rules governing the actions of the United States come from statutes rather 
than common law.210 Because statutory law appears to Justice Scalia to be 
the wave of the federal law future,211 engaging in interpretation based on 
traditional tools of the common law is fraught with the risk of failure and 
can smack of separation of powers problems.212
Justice Scalia’s largest problem with the Cort analysis stems from the 
fact that the approach attempts to give a voice to the intent of the legislature 
while Justice Scalia prefers instead to examine the text that the legislature 
passed and discern its meaning from ordinary usage of those words passed 
into law.213 He rationalizes this approach:  
“it is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, 
even with fair government, to have what the meaning of a law deter-
mined by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver 
promulgated. That seems to me one step worse than the trick the em-
peror Nero was said to engage in: posting edicts high up on the pillars, 
so that they could not easily be read . . . . Men may intend what they 
will; but it is only the laws that they enact which bind us.”214
207
 But see Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 375-76 (“Because the Rigsby approach prevailed throughout 
most of our history, there is no merit to the argument advanced by petitioners that the judicial recogni-
tion of an implied private remedy violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.”) (internal footnotes omit-
ted). 
208
 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 192 (“If a change is to be made, we should get out of the business of 
implied private rights of action altogether.”). 
209
 See Antonin Scalia, Federal Courts and the Law, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, 9-14 
(Amy Gutmann ed., Princeton University Press 1997). 
210
 Id. at 13. 
211
 Id. (noting that “[e]very issue of law resolved by a federal judge involves interpretation of 
text—the text of a regulation, or of a statute, or of the Constitution” but that “a very small proportion of 
judges’ work is constitutional interpretation in any event. (Even in the Supreme Court, I would estimate 
that well less than a fifth of the issues we confront are constitutional issues—and probably less than a 
twentieth if you exclude criminal-law cases).”). 
212
 See id. at 14. 
213
 Id. at 16-17. 
214
 Id. at 17. 
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Scalia may be correct that inferring legislative intent into a statute runs 
the risk of leaving the ordinary citizen unsure as to the meaning of the law. 
It follows that he is also correct that legislative intent runs the additional 
risk of having the judge inadvertently interpret such intent in a way that 
appears to make him act as a mini-legislature.215 This is because the judge, 
forced to make assumptions about legislative intent, runs an all too great 
risk of placing her personal beliefs and values into the statute.216
This theory of the how to construe intent does not preclude what 
Scalia labels “lapsus linguae” or a “slip of the tongue”217 when some con-
gressional intent would be examined where a literal reading in extreme 
cases would lead to absurd results.218 This does not give the judge the 
power to interpret the statute simply in the light that is most reasonable 
since interpretation for the most reasonable intent returns to the problem of 
the judge replacing congressional intent with his own.219 This textualist 
understanding, Justice Scalia argues, should not be confused with strict 
constructionism since textualism does not attempt to interpret a text 
“strictly” or “leniently” but instead reasonably.220 While he does note that 
critics view the approach as formalistic, he is happy to accept that criticism 
and instead appears to view that as a virtue.221
Justice Scalia turns this understanding of interpretation towards impli-
cation cases in much the same manner.222 He argues, “legislative history 
should not be used as an authoritative indication of a statute’s meaning.”223
This is because implication cases present a “distinctive difficulty because 
[they] involve[] one of those so-called ‘implied’ causes of action that, for 
several decades, this Court was prone to discover in—or, more accurately, 
create in reliance upon—federal legislation.”224 Justice Scalia’s view on 
legislative history is not without precedent on the Court.225 Justice Scalia 
215
 Id. at 18 (“When you are told to decide not on the basis of what the legislature said, but on the 
basis of what it meant, and are assured that there is no necessary connection between the two, your best 
shot at figuring out what the legislature meant is to ask what a wise and intelligent person should have 
meant; and that will surely bring you to the conclusion that the law means what you think it ought to 
mean.”).  
216
 Schuetze, supra note 92, at 427. 
217
 Scalia, supra note 209, at 20. 
218
 Id. 
219
 See id.
220
 Id. at 23. As an example of this distinction, Justice Scalia cites Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 
223 (1993), where the Court interpreted “use” of a firearm to include the sale of a gun. Id. Justice Scalia 
argues that such an interpretation, being clearly outside of the scope of the text, could only be found by 
a strict construction. Scalia, supra note 209, at 23. 
221
 Id. at 25.  
222
 Id. at 29-37. 
223
 Id. at 29-30. 
224
 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 365 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
225
 E.g., United States v. Pub. Util. Communications of California, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“I should concur in this result more readily if the Court could reach it by 
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argues that interpretation by use of legislative history is merely a new 
method used by judges and Justices to justify the search for legislative in-
tent.
226
Part of his concern about legislative history’s uses is that, besides con-
cerns about separation of powers,227 its use does not necessarily clarify the 
interpretation of the statute.228 This is because the legislature who finally 
must pass the law commonly have not engaged in the writing of the actual 
legislative history.229 Worse, the actual members of Congress often may not 
have even read the legislative history.230 Moreover, there have been some 
glaring modern examples of this problem since Justice Scalia first voiced 
this issue231 such as that of the recent appropriation of $400 billion Penta-
gon budget in which, upon being asked why he voted “present” rather than 
in support of the bill, Brian Baird, the United States Representative from 
Vancouver, Oregon, admitted: 
The frustrating thing is that thing will become law before anyone ex-
cept the few, the handful on the conference committee, have had a 
chance to read it. We had a two- or three-page handout, and it hit the 
highlights . . . . This was an authorization bill. There's no reason other 
than politics that that had to be done on Friday . . . . But $400 billion 
deserves more than three hours' review.232
Based on these concerns and similar views as it pertains to separation 
of powers concerns, legislative history (or at least legislative history as it is 
understood in a Congressional Report) is simply not enough to either indi-
cate legislative intent or have the same power as that of the passed law and 
therefore should not be used.233 Notably, Justice Scalia has asserted that in 
one of the only cases in which he was tempted to use legislative history, his 
result would have differed from those who did use that history.234
With this understanding of Scalia’s view on the uses and failures of 
legislative intent (and vicariously legislative history used to discern that 
analysis of the statute instead of by psychoanalysis of Congress. When we decide from legislative his-
tory, including statements of witnesses at hearings, what Congress probably had in mind, we must put 
ourselves in the place of a majority of Congressmen and act according to the impression we think this 
history should have made on them. Never having been a Congressman, I am handicapped in that weird 
endeavor. That process seems to me not interpretation of a statute but creation of a statute.”). 
226
 Scalia, supra note 209, at 31. 
227
 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769-70 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Although I agree with much in Part IV [of 
the majority’s opinion], I cannot join it because the judicial lawmaking role it invites would commit the 
Federal Judiciary to a task it is neither authorized nor suited to perform.”).  
228
 Scalia, supra note 209, at 32. 
229
 Id. at 34.  
230
 Id. at 32-34 (citing to 128 Cong. Rec. 16918-19, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 19, 1982).  
231
 See Baird Discusses Bills, Seniors, OREGONIAN, Nov. 11, 2003, at B1-B2. 
232
 Id. 
233
 Scalia, supra note 209, at 35. 
234
 Id. at 36. 
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intent), it is little surprise that Scalia has rarely supported implied causes of 
action.235 To be sure, he has supported judgments acknowledging implied 
causes of action in certain cases where the Court already previously inter-
preted the statute to contain a private remedy.236 Those situations, however, 
may be limited to specific situations that created them.237 In general, his 
interpretation has been one of the more consistent doctrines on this issue238
and his view seems to have strengthened in the eyes of the rest of the Court.  
In Thompson, Justice Scalia’s view on the matter broke into the 
open.239 Part of the reason for this was the Court’s statement of belief that 
“our focus on congressional intent does not mean that we require evidence 
that Members of Congress, in enacting the statute, actually had in mind the 
creation of a private cause of action.”240 In rebutting this assumption, how-
ever, Justice Scalia appears to accept the existence (though admittedly re-
jecting the use) of a middle ground.241 Notably, while attempting to dispute 
the majority’s view, Justice Scalia helped to fuel an already raging debate 
on the validity of the use of context in implication cases.242 Justice Scalia 
may oppose the use of such a method of interpretation,243 but other judges 
and scholars have taken up the cause. In fact, some have gone so far as to 
suggest that Justice Scalia’s own assumptions in this decision lacked foun-
dation.244
235
 See appendix. 
236
 E.g., Lampf, 501 U.S. at 364-66 (Scalia, J., concurring); Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76-78 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (acknowledging an implied cause of action in a statute where previous Supreme Court cases 
have interpreted the same statute); see also David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Explo-
ration of Scalia’s Fidelity to his Constitutional Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1413 n.188, (1999) 
(arguing that Justice Scalia has been more supportive than expected towards the use of precedent). But 
see N. Star Steel Co. v. Thomas, 515 U.S. 29 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (accepting an implied cause 
of action but arguing that “the cause of action at issue here was created not by us, but by Congress”).  
237
 In fact, Lampf dealt with an implied right to recover against others once an implied cause of 
action has been found against a defendant. Lampf, 501 U.S. at 352; see also Franklin, 503 U.S. at 78 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“Because of legislation enacted subsequent to Cannon, it is too late in the day to 
address whether a judicially implied exclusion of damages under Title IX would be appropriate.”). 
238
 See, e.g., Thompson, 484 U.S. at 174 (Scalia, J., concurring) (refusing to imply a cause of 
action based on legislative intent and legislative history); Jett, 491 U.S. at 738 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(joining the Court “except insofar as it relies upon legislative history”). 
239
 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188.  
240
 Id. at 178. 
241
 Id. at 191 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that “the Court’s opinion exaggerates the difficulty of 
establishing an implied right when it surmises that ‘[the implied cause of action doctrine would be a 
virtual dead letter were it limited to correcting drafting errors when Congress simply forgot to codify its 
evident intention to provide a cause of action’ . . . that statement rests upon the erroneous premise that 
one never implies anything except when he forgets to say it expressly”) (internal citations omitted).  
242
 Id. at 190. 
243
 Id.
244
 Schuetze, supra note 92, at 426 (arguing that “even though Scalia argued that Cort was over-
ruled by later cases, he misread those later decisions . . . . As such, Cort has not been overruled, but has 
merely been limited”). 
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In Alexander v. Sandoval,245 Scalia, writing for the majority, acknowl-
edged that statutory intent to determine if a statute contains an implied 
cause of action is determinative.246 He then pointed out that “without it, a 
cause does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable 
that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”247
This approach may have received new adherents on the Court.248
1.    Other Doctrines Support Scalia’s Approach 
Scalia’s views are not out of keeping with other reigning Supreme 
Court doctrines. As an example, when federalism issues have arisen and a 
state court attempts to address a potentially federal issue, the Supreme 
Court has required that the state court express a clear statement to the effect 
that it has decided the issue based on state law.249 As the Supreme Court 
pointed out, if the state court “indicates clearly and expressly that it is alter-
natively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds, 
we, of course, will not undertake to review the decision.”250 Thus, when a 
plaintiff asks the Court to examine a decision by a state court that decided 
the issue under state grounds, the Supreme Court will defer to the state’s 
interpretation.251 Alternatively, if the state court does not so expressly state 
that it is deciding the case on state grounds, but instead appears to decide 
the issue based on federal concerns, the Supreme Court can, and arguably 
must,
252
 intervene.253
Admittedly, the analogy between the Court’s plain statement rule and 
Justice Scalia’s implied causes of action rule have significant differences. 
For instance, while the former addresses federalism concerns between the 
state and federal government, implication cases involve primarily separa-
245
 Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275. 
246
 Id. at 286. 
247
 Id. at 286-87. 
248
 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2762-63 (Souter, J.) (holding that “this Court has recently and repeatedly 
said that a decision to create a private right of action is one better left to legislative judgment in the great 
majority of cases.”). 
249
 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). 
250
 Id. at 1041.  
251
 It is not always the case that the state and federal grounds are distinct, however. Thomas E. 
Baker, The Ambiguous Independent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a 
Mobius Strip, 19 GA. L. REV. 799, 800 (1985). 
252
 See generally Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (noting that “no state legislator or execu-
tive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution without violating his undertaking to support it”). 
But see Baker, supra note 251, at 805-07 (“The important distinction to be made is that the doctrine is 
not constitutionally required, although it has several possible authorizations.”). 
253
 In a similar analogy, the Supreme Court has required criminal defendants to clearly and fairly 
present federal claims of relief in state court before seeking habeas proceedings in federal court so that 
the state court can be alerted of the federal nature of the claim. Baldwin v. Reese, 124 S. Ct. 1347, 1349 
(2004). 
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tion of powers issues.254 Additionally, the former generally stays within the 
province of the judicial branches; the latter addresses inter-branch concerns. 
However, while those differences may be significant, nevertheless, Su-
preme Court doctrines in other areas where Constitutional issues create 
analogous situations have tended to lead towards similar and analogous 
tests.
255
 Hence, it would not be improper to note that Scalia’s approach to 
implied causes of action, i.e., asking for a clear statement from the legisla-
ture in the statute itself, would be analogous to other Supreme Court ap-
proaches in other areas of constitutional law and therefore not necessarily 
as radical a departure as some believe. Some have even hinted that the 
Court has made strides towards this view without even knowing it,256
though it may yet be too early to make that assumption.  
2.    Pragmatically, The Supreme Court Will Not Go This Far 
Justice Scalia’s criticisms have merit in the circumstance of implica-
tion cases. It is difficult to believe that Congress, having gone through the 
entire legislative process could pass a statute implying a right of action 
without a single legislator voicing a position on whether the statute confers 
that right.257 While Scalia’s approach may be sound, the practical matter of 
counting Supreme Court Justices shows that it does not appear to hold a 
majority of the Court. While Justice Scalia’s view may have attracted some 
on the Court, the majority appears to remain tethered to the use of legisla-
tive history and legislative intent to determine implication cases. While the 
last dozen cases out of the Supreme Court have shown a shift towards less 
implication in statutes, the majority has not yet abandoned the theory of 
254
 Creswell, supra note 137, at 1003 (arguing that federalism concerns also exist in implication 
cases).  
255
 A notable example of this is in the areas of the state powers in light of the Commerce Clause as 
compared with the state powers in light of Article IV privileges and immunities. For instance, in S. Pac. 
v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), part of the test for the commerce clause power of the state was whether 
the burden placed by the state was against out of state citizens and whether the actions of the state had 
comparative benefits that such a burden was reasonable. In United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of 
Camden County & Vicinity v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984), the Court 
noted that part of the Article IV privileges or immunities includes whether there is a substantial burden 
placed on out of state citizens and whether the actions of the state would be necessary to solve some evil 
related to those out of state citizens.  
256
 Willscher, supra note 124, at 265 (noting that “although the rest of the Court has not adopted 
Justice Scalia’s view, many of the Court’s recent opinions have refused to find a cause of action without 
a plain statement from Congress”). 
257
 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 381 (1978) (holding that “there is no 
express provision for private actions to enforce Title VI and it would be quite incredible if Congress, 
after so carefully attending to the matter of private actions in other Titles of the Act, intended silently to 
create a private cause of action to enforce Title VI”); Schuetze, supra note 92, at 429 (“It is hard to 
believe that a law could emerge from the cumbersome legislative process without including such a vital 
provision as whether the federal courts are available to enforce the law's provisions.”). 
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implication as a whole, or even the use of legislative history towards under-
standing that intent.258
The majority of the Court may not hold Justice Scalia’s view now or in 
the near future,259 but there do appear to be indications that his concerns are 
currying favor with at least some other Justices on the Court,260 some lower 
judges in the federal circuits,261 as well as scholars in the legal commu-
nity.262 Some scholars, however, have naturally disputed Scalia on several 
of these points. Another expressed concern is that even if one accepts the 
concerns expressed by Justices Scalia and Powell that use of Cort’s other 
factors, and to some extent, use of legislative intent as the determinative 
factor leads to judicial policymaking, still, this offers no reason to oppose 
the enforcement of a statute that creates rights.263 Even if one were to accept 
that legislative intent itself should not be the determinative factor, the Pow-
ell/Scalia approach to implied causes of action still fails to give a valid ar-
gument as to their opposition of all of the Cort factors.264
a) Critiquing Scalia’s Assumptions.  Others have pointed out that 
textualism itself is far from a perfect theory on how to interpret statutes.265
To them, a statute is far from clear in more cases than Justice Scalia be-
lieves.266 Justice Scalia’s approach additionally refuses to examine legisla-
tive history to see what those in Congress believed the text meant267 even 
though the Scalia textualist appears willing to look at less direct evidence, 
such as dictionaries, for guidance on the meaning of a statute.268 This ap-
258
 See appendix. 
259
 See F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 124 S. Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004) (Breyer, J.) 
(“For those who find legislative history useful, the House Report’s account should end the matter. Oth-
ers . . . may reach the same conclusion . . . .”). 
260
 See Mank, supra note 32, at 825-26 (noting that both Justices Thomas and Kennedy have 
shown support for a textualist approach but that Kennedy has since moved from a pure textualist 
model). 
261
 See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 59, 60-61 (1987) (noting that “the words of the statute, and not the intent of the drafters, 
are the ‘law’”). 
262
 Creswell, supra note 137, at 1003. 
263
 Mazzuchi, supra note 33, at 1089. 
264
 See id. at 1090 (“Despite Justice Powell's objections to judicial policymaking, the Court 
seemed to conclude that if it did not create an implied right of action it would fail to enforce the stat-
ute.”). 
265
 See Mank, supra note 32, at 826 (“Numerous commentators have criticized the textualist 
method of statutory interpretation and argued that judges should examine extrinsic sources, such as 
legislative history, as a means to reconstruct congressional intent or purposes in enacting a statutory 
provision, especially if the textual terms are ambiguous.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
266
 Id. at 827. 
267
 See Scalia, supra note 209, at 32-34. 
268
 MCI Telecoms. Corp. v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218 (1994). The willingness to use dictionary defini-
tions is not, however, confined to the textualist approach. See Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 124 
141
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proach, to some critics, appears to be just as arbitrary a way to determine 
meaning as examination of intent.269 A third concern is that textualists must 
inherently rely on canons of interpretation that tend, at times, to appear to 
contradict each other.270 Legislative history, while imperfect, at least gives 
more credence to what Congress intended rather than the choice of judicial 
canon.
Commentators further argue that there is some indication that Con-
gress itself dislikes this judicial approach to the interpretation of statutes.271
They point out that the evidence appears to show that cases decided by a 
court employing textualist interpretation is more likely to be overturned by 
Congress through statutory amendment than one made by courts using other 
means of interpretation.272 Even if this criticism were true, it fails to make a 
compelling argument against textualism.273 Congress may prefer and intend 
for a court to interpret much into a statute (and therefore to use such things 
as legislative intent). Nevertheless, the fact that Congress adjusted their 
statutes to overrule what textualist decisions saw as wanting implicitly 
meant that Congress moved to make their intent expressly known through 
the new legislation, meeting exactly the concerns made by textualists by 
clearly stating their intent in the text of the new statute.  
The scholarly argument against Justice Scalia’s basic premises on in-
terpretation has not changed his mind. Yet, even Justice Scalia would give 
up on removing previously granted implied causes of action.274 Justice 
S. Ct. 1836, 1845 n.15-16 (2004) (Stevens, J.) (citing the American Heritage Dictionary, Black’s Law 
Dictionary, and the Oxford English Dictionary for definitions of statutory language).  
269
 Mank, supra note 32, at 828. 
270
 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
about How Statutes are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401 (1950). This theory, however, ne-
glects the fact that significant anti-textualist jurists regularly employ these same tools. E.g., F. Hoffman-
La Rouche Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 2366 (Breyer, J.) (relying on a rule of statutory construction to “assume 
that legislators take account of the legitimate sovereign interests of other nations when they write 
American laws”); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1245 (2004) (Breyer, J.) (holding 
that while the general canon of statutory construction is that identical words in different parts of the 
same statute should convey the identical meaning, “the presumption is not rigid and readily yields 
whenever there is such variation in the connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant 
the conclusion that they were employed in different parts of the act with different intent”) (internal 
quotations omitted).  
271
 Mank, supra note 32, at 828. 
272
 Id.; see also Musick, 508 U.S. at 293-94 (noting that Congress overruled the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Lampf by taking away the holding’s retroactive effect). 
273
 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 192 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I believe, moreover, that Congress 
would welcome the certainty that [eliminating implied causes of action] would produce. Surely consci-
entious legislators cannot relish the current situation, in which the existence or nonexistence of a private 
right of action depends upon which of the opposing legislative forces may have guessed right as to the 
implications the statute will be found to contain.”). 
274
 See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279 (accepting that “it is clear from our decisions, from Congress’s 
amendments of Title VI . . . [that] private individuals may sue to enforce Section 601 of Title VI and 
obtain both injunctive relief and damages”). See generally Thompson, 484 U.S. at 192 (Scalia, J., con-
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Scalia may be right on his criticisms and concerns. However, as any first 
year law student learns, being right does not necessarily translate into being 
followed by a majority. Thus, Justice Scalia’s approach must necessarily be 
placed aside as an idea perhaps ahead of its time, temporarily replaced with 
other ideas more in line with current Supreme Court approaches. 
B.    The Contextualist Response 
One alternative approach to Justice Scalia’s view would be to take a 
statute that is silent on causes of action and silent on its legislative history 
and to ask whether Congress passed the statute in an era when the Supreme 
Court implied causes of action with more frequency. This contextualist ap-
proach argues that it is necessary at times to interpret statutes based on leg-
islative silence because most times that the statute is silent, the legislative 
intent is similarly silent. Additionally, the Court has teasingly suggested this 
approach on occasion, though it has never relied on it as a sole factor to the 
chagrin of many scholars. 
Contextualism appears to have grown upon Justice Stevens’s comment 
that “[i]t is always appropriate to assume that our elected representatives, 
like other citizens, know the law.”275 Justice Stevens’ argument thus rests on 
the premise that Congress, in knowing the state of Supreme Court law in all 
areas and importantly, in the area of implied causes of action, must have 
duly intended implication according to Supreme Court law for statutes 
passed at that time to be implied.276
This argument appears logical in that the Court should hold Congress 
to a standard no less than that of the average citizen.277 It is, however, noth-
ing more than a constructive assumption.278 It rests on an assumption that 
Congress acts with one united voice at all times throughout history.279 In-
deed, the Supreme Court has said as much, noting that “[w]e shall assume 
for the sake of argument (though we by no means accept) that Congress 
curring) (noting that “if a change is to be made, we should get out of the business of implied private 
rights of action altogether”). 
275
 Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 379 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-97).  
276
 See id.
277
 See Boyer, supra note 19, at 757 (noting that “citizens must be presumed to know something 
about the law if laws are to be applied consistently. Ignorance of the law, of course, is no excuse for a 
failure to comply with the law, for a member of Congress any more than for an average citizen.”). 
278
 Id. at 757 (noting “it is not seriously contended that any person, or any member of Congress, is 
actually aware of the full extent and detail of the laws to which he is subject”). This assumption also 
contains another underlying assumption: that Congress, in passing the law, was not mistaken about the 
law itself. Brown v. Gen. Serv. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 828 (1976) (holding that “the relevant inquiry is 
not whether Congress correctly perceived the then state of the law, but rather what its perception of the 
state of the law was”). 
279
 The Supreme Court itself identified the weakness of this assumption. Johnson v. Trans. Agency, 
480 U.S. 616, 630 n.7 (1987) (“When a court says to the legislature: ‘you (or your predecessor) meant 
X,’ it almost invites the legislature to answer: ‘We did not.’”). 
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must be presumed to have had . . . [a relatively obscure decision] in mind as 
the backdrop to all its legislation.”280 The Supreme Court’s use of context 
has therefore been haphazard at best281 and never as the sole rationale.282 In 
all fairness to the intellectual community, even textualists at times engage in 
contextual assumptions.283 Some have gone so far as to point out that even 
Justice Scalia has engaged in a contextualist approach.284 This wishful 
thinking does not appear to have resulted in Scalia’s support of contextual-
ism in general.285
1.    Distinguishing Among Contextualists 
To be fair, the contextualism in Curran and the contextualism argued 
for by scholars appear to be somewhat distinct.286 The Curran contextual-
ism, also seen in Cannon, involved the judicial interpretation of a statute or 
a related statute prior to the one at issue in the case.287 The argument for this 
form of contextualism runs that statutory language, having been previously 
given certain meaning by the Supreme Court, should be given a similar 
280
 Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991); see also Morse v. Republican Party 
of Va., 517 U.S. 186, 234 n.47 (1996) (holding that even though a more stringent implication approach 
came into being before the statute was passed, the timing between the decision and the amendment was 
not far enough for Congress to have been expected to apply it). 
281
 See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 296 n.7 (noting that while the respondent argued for legislative 
context in interpreting a statute, “[w]e cannot assume from legislative silence on private rights of action, 
that Congress anticipated that a general regulatory prohibition . . . would provide an automatic basis for 
a private remedy in the nature of common-law nuisance”); see also Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 378 
(“The key to these cases is our understanding of the intent of Congress in 1974 when it comprehensively 
reexamined and strengthened the federal regulation of futures trading.”). 
282
 Stabile, supra note 18, at 892. 
283
 See Mank, supra note 32, at 833 (“Justice Scalia assumes that the ‘whole Congress’s is com-
posed of legislators that both use words based on their most common or ordinary usage, and that these 
legislators are cognizant of related statutes and judicial decisions.”). 
284
 Nancy Eisenhauer, Comment, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Statutes: the Air Carri-
ers Access Act of 1986, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1183, 1193 (1992) (“Justice Scalia carefully considered the 
context of the statute’s enactment, and in fact used the current test only after determining that no test 
existed during the time of the statute’s enactment.”).  
285
 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (stating that “context alone cannot suffice”). 
286
 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that context is relevant only in cases where “the judicial 
interpretation of related legislation prior to the subject statute’s enactment or of the same legislation 
prior to its reenactment, had been held to create private rights of action”). 
287
 See Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 379; see also Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696-97 (noting that “[i]n 
1972 when Title IX was enacted, the critical language in Title VI had already been construed as creating 
a private remedy” in other similar civil rights acts); Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 1083 (holding that 
implication cases where the Court has previously implied causes of action and Congress has not acted in 
contravention raises the contextual analysis); Franklin, 503 U.S. at 71-73 (noting that the question of 
whether an implied cause of action existed under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 was in 
part based on the silence of Congress to judicial interpretation of the Civil Rights Remedies Equaliza-
tion Amendment of 1986); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 189-90 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting “we have held 
context to be relevant to our determination in only two cases—both of which involved statutory lan-
guage that, in the judicial interpretation of related legislation prior to the subject statute’s enactment, or 
of the same legislation prior to its reenactment, had been held to create private rights of action”). 
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reading when a similar statute or similar language is found in the case at 
bar.288 To avoid confusion, this Comment will refer to this form of contex-
tualism as “term of art” contextualism.  
Scholars appear to take this to include a form of contextualism when 
Congress passes a statute in light of the Court’s general interpretation of 
implied causes of action, however.289 Thus, if a court today were to receive 
a case in 2004 involving a statute passed in 1905 and found it necessary to 
engage in a contextual analysis, it would look at the state of statutory law as 
well as judicial interpretation of implied rights of action as it stood in 
1905.290 Scholars call this form of contextualism the “acquiescence doc-
trine.”291 In its purest form, it would find intent to create a cause of action 
through longstanding practice known to Congress.292
It is unclear if the “acquiescence doctrine” necessarily follows from 
“term of art” contextualism, though the Court has recently implied in dicta
that this is a reasonable approach.293 Additionally, as Justice Douglas 
pointed out, “an error in interpreting a federal statute may be easily reme-
died. If this Court has failed to perceive the intention of Congress, or has 
interpreted a statute in such a manner as to thwart the legislative purpose, 
Congress may change [the statute].”294 Thus in most cases, the two forms of 
288
 See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 593 n.14 (“Congress, with full awareness of how the agencies were 
interpreting Title VI, has modeled later statutes on § 601 of Title VI, thus indicating approval of the 
administrative definition.”). 
289
 E.g., Stabile, supra note 18, at 888-89 (noting as an example that ERISA, replacing common 
law of trusts, would be subject to implication by the context of the common law on trusts).  
290
 See Mank, supra note 32, at 843 (pointing out that this form of contextualism addresses the 
question of what to do when “a 1995 court is deciding whether to imply a private right of action for a 
statute enacted in 1965”); Stabile, supra note 18, at 889-90 (noting that “if a 1995 court is deciding 
whether to imply a cause of action from a statute enacted in 1933, that court must determine congres-
sional intent based on how courts in 1933 viewed implication, and on the 1933 Congress’s understand-
ing of how those courts viewed implication”). This is not unlike the approach demanded by Justice 
Brennan. Jett, 491 U.S. at 742 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It would make no sense, however, to apply 
a test first enunciated in 1975 to a statute enacted in 1866.”). 
291
 Some would argue that this doctrine’s proper name is “Congressional Ratification Theory.” 
Mank, supra note 32, at 861. However, this name has not curried favor on the Court. Cent. Bank, 511 
U.S. at 186 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (commenting that “our observations on the acquiescence doctrine 
indicate its limitations as an expression of congressional intent”). Additionally, scholars have accepted 
the term as “acquiescence doctrine.” See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 206 (referencing this theory as “ . . . 
the theory of legislative acquiescence . . . ”). Finally, ratification is defined as “approval; sanction; 
confirmation.” WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1496 (Jean L. McKechnie ed., 
2d ed. 1983). Instead, a more correct name would be “congressional acquiescence theory” since Web-
ster’s defines “acquiescence” as “a quiet assent…silent submission.” Id. at 18.  
292
 See Davant, supra note 50, at 634 (“That agencies for decades have promulgated regulations 
that purport to confer individual rights on classes of plaintiffs, without interference or objection by 
either Congress or the courts, is some evidence that agencies are acting in a manner that the Constitution 
authorizes.”). 
293
 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181 (noting that the context of the act was an issue for the Court to 
examine). 
294
 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 133-34 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Hilton 
v. S.C. Pub. Ry. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (pointing out that “considerations of stare decisis
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context would become indistinguishable after the Court has made its deter-
mination.295 The Supreme Court’s holdings have far from supported use of 
either form of contextualism as a sole rationale.296  Holdings appear mixed, 
however, as to whether context has value in the determination of congres-
sional intent.297
Scholars have argued that the Supreme Court should deal with the 
question of implication by legislative silence by looking at the context of 
the statute’s passage.298 This rationale argues, “congressional silence in the 
wake of the judicial construction of a statute indicates congressional ap-
proval of that judicial construction.”299 Some argue that context itself be-
came an additional factor added to the Cort analysis,300 although the Court 
have special force in the area of statutory interpretation [because] unlike in the context of constitutional 
interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have 
done”). Cf. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978) (noting that “although we 
have stated that stare decisis has more force in statutory analysis than in constitutional adjudication 
because, in the former situation, Congress can correct our mistakes through legislation, we have never 
applied stare decisis mechanically to prohibit overruling our earlier decisions determining the meaning 
of statutes”) (internal citations omitted). 
295
 In fact, the “term of art contextualist” would refuse to reinterpret the statute in a different way 
unless the statutory language were changed to result in a different reading under then current Supreme 
Court law while the “historical contextualist” would refuse to reinterpret the statute in a different way 
unless Congress affirmatively acts to change the statute to reflect that it disagreed with the Court’s 
decision. Under either approach, the contextualist would insist that the next move would belong to 
Congress to change the statute. 
296
 E.g., Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 (noting that Cort itself involved interpretation of a statute 
under a previous understanding and yet that did not prevent the court from interpreting the statute inde-
pendent of context for intent); Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 176; Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employ-
ees, Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 535 (1989) (relying in part on the fact that the judiciary had previously 
played no role in allowing causes of action in this situation and therefore the historical context of the 
statute did not constitute enough evidence to support a cause of action); see also Kaufman, supra note 4, 
at 168-69 (stating that the Supreme Court has not accepted “acquiescence” as a valid basis for creation 
of an implied right of action). 
297
 Compare Musick, 508 U.S. 286 (relying in part on the “acquiescence doctrine”) and General 
Dynamic, 124 S. Ct. at 1244-45 (holding in part that “[t]he very strength of this consensus [of interpreta-
tion among the circuit courts] is enough to rule out any serious claim of ambiguity, and congressional 
silence after years of judicial interpretation supports adherence to the traditional view”) with Patterson v. 
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.1 (1989) (“It does not follow . . . that Congress’s failure to 
overturn a statutory precedent is reason for this Court to adhere to it. It is impossible to assert with any 
degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents affirmative congressional approval of the 
Court's statutory interpretation. Congress may legislate, moreover, only through the passage of a bill 
which is approved by both Houses and signed by the President. Congressional inaction cannot amend a 
duly enacted statute.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Schuetz, supra note 92, at 426 (noting that 
“while context alone will not suffice, it is not accurate to say that context is immaterial”). 
298
 E.g., Mank, supra note 32, at 829-44; Stabile, supra note 18, at 888-93; Boyer, supra note 19, 
at 754-58; Eisenhauer, supra note 284, at 1192-207. 
299
 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 206. 
300
 See Boyer, supra note 19, at 756 (commenting that Merrill Lynch “made a unique contribution 
to the development of the doctrine of implied rights of action” because “[u]ntil Merrill Lynch, the four 
Cort factors were treated as exhaustive. In Merrill Lynch . . . Justice Stevens establish[ed] a new method 
of raising a presumption of congressional intent . . . ”). 
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has never held such an interpretation.301 Implication arguably works both 
ways, existing to support an implied cause of action where the legislative 
intent is silent or existing to deny an implied cause of action where the leg-
islative intent tends otherwise to support the implication.302 Notably, schol-
ars more often invoke context arguing for an implied cause of action in 
some statute rather than against.303
2.    Contextualism: A Doubtful Method of Interpretation 
Interpretation by context is one of the more dubious ways to discern 
congressional intent imaginable. As a preliminary matter, it does not com-
port with an obvious analogy of how the Supreme Court itself interprets its 
own past holdings.304 In addition, context requires that the Court in 2004 
examine a statute passed in 1905 with an understanding of the state of the 
law in 1905.305 Granting that some presumptions and legal fictions are nec-
essarily required in a search for legislative intent when the congressional 
history is devoid of such intent,306 this approach still seems far too prob-
lematic to be entertained as a legitimate way to interpret a statute. It is irra-
tional to claim that the Supreme Court can easily find Congressional intent 
301
 Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 353. 
302
 Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72 (holding that “the same contextual approach used to justify an implied 
right of action more than amply demonstrates the lack of any legislative intent to abandon the traditional 
presumption in favor of all available remedies”). Boyer, supra note 19, at 756. See generally Cent. 
Bank, 511 U.S. at 180 (holding that since Congress created express rights of action with certain limits, 
“it would be . . .  anomalous to impute to Congress an intention in effect to expand the defendant class 
for [an implied cause of action] beyond the bounds delineated for comparable express causes of ac-
tion”). 
303
 E.g., Boller, supra note 37, at 1326-27 (arguing that the context of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 lends itself towards an implied cause of action as it is a civil rights statute); Boyer, supra note 19, 
at 758 (arguing that the context of the Brook Amendment of 1981 lends itself towards an implied cause 
of action); Eisenhauer, supra note 284, at 1197-98 (arguing that the context of the Air Carriers Access 
Act of 1986 lends itself towards an implied cause of action); Harner, supra note 92, at 930-31 (arguing 
that the context of the United States Housing Act of 1937 lends itself towards an implied cause of ac-
tion); Sagers, supra note 19, at 1389-90 (arguing that the context of the Real Estate Settlement Proce-
dures Act lends itself towards an implied cause of action). 
304
 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 285 n.5 (pointing out that while the majority opinion in a previous case 
did not mention a position of the concurrence, the majority’s “holding is not made coextensive with the 
concurrence because their opinion does not expressly preclude the concurrence's approach. The Court 
would be in an odd predicament if a concurring minority of the Justices could force the majority to 
address a point they found unnecessary (and did not wish) to address, under compulsion of Justice 
Stevens’ new principle that silence implies agreement.”) (internal citations omitted). 
305
 Boyer, supra note 19. This, of course, requires an assumption that the Court must examine the 
intent of Congress at the time of the passage. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287 (“Not even when interpreting 
the same Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that was at issue in Borak have we applied Borak’s method 
for discerning and defining causes of action.”). 
306
 Even legislative history filled with Congress’s views on the matter at hand might constitute a 
legal fiction called “congressional intent.” See notes 210-33 and accompanying text. 
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using context from as recent as the past 20 years.307 It would be almost 
laughable to suggest that the Court is capable of properly interpreting the 
congressional mood of 90 years ago. For too many implied causes of action, 
the Court may have to do just that.308 This is not to say that implication 
cases should require the Supreme Court to infer into a statute passed during 
the Depression the intent of the current sitting Congress. Instead, the Court 
should be highly wary of the use of contextual evidence altogether in that 
case because of the inherent risk that the Court, examining legislative intent 
from the only “context” humans can, from history and from experience, 
might implicitly transfer the intent of the Congress it knows for the intent of 
the Congress it does not know. 
3.    Contextualism as a Creator of Yet More Separation Problems 
As an additional note to the question of the validity of context, the use 
of context itself may expose deep problems concerning separation of pow-
ers that may result in a general denial of the validity of the implication doc-
trine itself. An example of this is Sandoval.309 The Supreme Court, deciding 
whether to lower the standard of proof in an implied cause of action under 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, considered (though ultimately re-
jected) the views of the executive branch on the matter.310 Hence, in this 
case it was possible that the Executive Branch in 2001 would be able to 
interpret the Congressional intent of the Legislative Branch of 1964 and 
explain that intent to the Judicial Branch of 2001.311 Regardless of the abil-
ity of the Executive to accomplish this feat of historic interpretation, one 
would be foolish not to ask how much intent would be left of Congress after 
both concurrent Branches have had their say on the matter. As one scholar 
pointed out, “[s]uch an interplay between Congress and the Supreme Court 
307
 See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181 (attempting and ultimately failing to find a cause of action in an 
eight-year-old statute). 
308
 See, e.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 547 n.16 (pointing out that “even if the 91st Congress had 
believed that there was an implied right of action under § 17(a) . . . ” of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, it would not have mattered because the intent in question would be that of Congress in 1934); Va. 
Bankshares, 501 U.S. 1083 (determining the viability of an implied cause of action for the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 by the Court in 1991); see also Skalaban, supra note 79, at 1514 (noting that “an 
especially fertile ground for implication is the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and the rules prom-
ulgated thereunder by the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . ”).  
309
 Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275. 
310
 Id. at 287-88.  
311
 Amicus Brief for United States at 14, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). However, 
the Supreme Court did agree with the position of the Executive in other cases. E.g., Contu, 450 U.S. at 
780 (agreeing with the Executive on the proper interpretation of the Portal-to-Portal Act); Merrill Lynch,
456 U.S. at 387 (agreeing with the Executive on whether a private cause of action existed in the Com-
modities Exchange Act). 
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regarding private remedies . . . represents a startling judicial rejection of the 
constitutionally mandated separation of powers.”312
Finally, use of context to assume that Congress assented to the judicial 
interpretation of the statute has the added difficulty of assuming congres-
sional intent through congressional inaction. When Congress explicitly cre-
ates a cause of action, it also implicitly grants judicial authority to interpret 
the statute.313 When the judiciary finds an implied cause of action, however, 
it is difficult to justify an argument that a conscious “delegation” of con-
gressional authority to add and adjust legislatively granted causes of action 
has occurred.314 Rather, the Court, by using this approach to admit an im-
plied cause of action may in fact be unconstitutionally expanding federal 
judicial power to the detriment of Congress.315 Until Congress passes a stat-
ute setting forth a cause of action explicitly (or explicitly denying one), the 
Legislative Branch has not made a deliberative act that can be interpreted as 
a desire to deal with the matter.316
C.    A New Approach to the Congressional Intent Test 
Finding Justice Scalia’s textualist approach impractical and the contex-
tualist approach overly problematic, the resulting question must be how the 
Supreme Court should interpret intent and how much intent must exist to 
positively or negatively establish legislative intent. A fair balance of the 
competing views would be for the Court to require some positive showing 
of intent from congressional members before accepting a positive finding 
under the legislative history factor of Cort. The Supreme Court should 
adopt this standard for three reasons. First, such an approach would satisfy 
Justice Powell’s concerns about separation of powers. Second, precedent 
generally supports this method of inferring congressional intent. Finally, 
several concurrent analogies already exist in Supreme Court doctrine to 
justify this approach. 
1.    This Approach Satisfies Concerns of Separation of Powers 
The first reason that the Supreme Court should require a positive 
showing of congressional intent is because the original purpose of focusing 
so much on the second factor was to give effect to legislative intent. Justice 
312
 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 221.  
313
 Edward A. Fallone, Section 10(B) and the Vagaries of Federal Common Law: The Merits of 
Codifying the Private Cause of Action Under a Structuralist Approach, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 108 
(1997). 
314
 Id.
315
 Kaufman, supra note 4, at 210 (“Even if Congress had acquiesced by its silence to the expan-
sion of federal judicial power beyond that contemplated . . . the federal courts could not constitutionally 
accept that power.”). 
316
 Fallone, supra note 313, at 108.  
145
282 FIU Law Review    [1:239 
Powell’s concerns about separation of powers would seemingly necessitate 
actual congressional evidence.317 As Justice Powell wrote in Cannon, “we 
should not condone the implication of any private action from a federal 
statute absent the most compelling evidence that Congress in fact intended 
such an action to exist.”318 For Justice Powell’s concerns to hold water, his 
approach must be grounded in the position that it is not enough for compel-
ling evidence from the history to show that Congress intended the cause of 
action to occur. Instead, the Powell approach logically requires evidence in 
the history that Congress actually intended the cause of action to exist. The 
Supreme Court has somewhat followed Justice Powell’s approach.319
Some form of “congressional speechmaking” or “floor debate” must 
exist on the issue in the least. Summations made by staff or presumptions 
made by the Court simply do not meet this burden. This helps to explain the 
concern that even more practical and less philosophical Justices have had 
with the Supreme Court’s change in direction in Thompson.320
The Supreme Court, by adopting the contextualist view on occasion,321
has moved away from this understanding by placing the presumptions about 
the expected intent of Congress to be on equal or even greater footing than 
that of concerns actually articulated by Congress.322 However, while the 
Court has wisely never used that rationale as the sole justification for its 
decision, it has left itself trapped into the position of potentially using this 
approach in situations where congressional intent clearly brushes the other 
way. Instead, the Court should stop engaging in this approach and insist that 
the question of intent to create a cause of action should start with Congress, 
not judicial interpretation of congressional silence.323
317
 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 749 (Powell, J., dissenting) (commenting that the Court “should not 
condone the implication of any private action from a federal statute absent the most compelling evi-
dence that Congress in fact intended such an action to exist”). 
318
 Id.
319
 See Schuetze, supra note 92, at 429 (noting that “the Supreme Court does not wish to engage in 
judicial legislation”). But see Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73-74 (holding that awarding of remedies for im-
plied rights of action did not create separation of powers concerns and that “selective abdication of the 
[ability of the judiciary to provide a remedy] would harm separation of powers principles in another 
way, by giving judges the power to render inutile causes of action authorized by Congress through a 
decision that no remedy is available”). 
320
 Thompson, 484 U.S. at 188 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
321
 See notes 275-85 and accompanying text on contextualism. 
322
 See notes 231-32 and accompanying text on the actual intent of Congressman Baird. 
323
 See generally Zeigler, supra note 18, at 116 (pointing out that “if Congress wants a statute to 
confer a right, create a cause of action, or provide a remedy, it must say so expressly, fully, and unambi-
guously. Moreover, the Court recently has made plain that if legislation is vague or incomplete, it is 
Congress’s job to fix it, not the Court’s”). 
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2.    This Approach Comports with Supreme Court Precedent 
An additional rationale for the court to require actual congressional in-
tent before meeting the second factor, and ultimately the entire Cort analy-
sis is that general Supreme Court precedent would be supportive of such a 
move, not opposed. Both recent precedents324 as well as earlier decisions, 
show this approach.325 Scholars have additionally noted that Supreme Court 
precedent requires that Congress actively intend a cause of action and can-
not be indifferent or neutral on the matter.326 This would be in keeping with 
the recent Supreme Court tendency to require clear statements from Con-
gress when Congress has the constitutional right to act in any way it sees 
fit.327
What is meant here is not that the Court would vicariously overrule all 
previous causes of action found. A Supreme Court decision requiring that 
from now on Congress provide the Court with some indication of actual 
intent on the issue would not overrule previous interpretations. Those inter-
pretations would still be valid under the “acquiescence doctrine” of contex-
tualism.328 As mentioned above, this is a form of contextualism where the 
Court assumes that Congress, having observed the Court interpret a statute 
to mean a certain thing, and having refused to act to adjust the statute, im-
plicitly accepted that interpretation as correct.329 This theory would still be 
viable as an explanation of congressional intent because its use would 
pragmatically retain the essential implied causes of action that litigants have 
traditionally relied upon.330
324
 E.g., Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275; Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 536 (“Had Congress intended the courts 
to enforce a federal employees union’s duty of fair representation, we would expect to find some evi-
dence of that intent in the statute or its legislative history.”). See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 174 n.3 (relying 
in part on statements made by Senators Durenberger and Wallop). But see Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. at 
1104 (noting that congressional silence is a serious obstacle, but it “is not, however, a necessarily insur-
mountable barrier”). 
325
 E.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569; Cannon, 441 U.S. at 688; Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 295-96 
(finding no indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, and therefore finding no cause of action); 
see also Kaufman supra note 4, at 205-06 (pointing out that “the Court has made it clear that the impli-
cation must be based on evidence of congressional intent”); Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377-78 (“The 
key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature.”) (internal quotes omitted); see also Guardians, 463 
U.S. at 610 (Powell, J., concurring) (finding that Title VI held clear legislative intent). 
326
 Stephen Grow, Note, Implying the Remedy of Corrective Disclosure Under the Williams Act,
1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 875, 888 (1986) (“Congressional indifference or neutrality regarding an implied 
cause of action is insufficient to justify continued judicial recognition of private rights of action.”). 
327
 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules 
as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 597 (1992) (noting that “the Court in the 1980s 
has tended to create the strongest clear statement rules to confine Congress’s power in areas in which 
Congress has the constitutional power to do virtually anything”). 
328
 Mank, supra note 32, at 861. 
329
 Id.
330
 See Musick, 508 U.S. at 292 (“Having implied the underlying liability in the first place, to now 
disavow any authority to allocate it on the theory that Congress has not addressed the issue would be 
most unfair to those against whom damages are assessed.”). See generally Planned Parenthood of 
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3.    Analogies to the Actual Intent Standard 
Four analogies generally support the position that the Supreme Court 
should imply a cause of action only when the legislative history expressly 
provides for one.331 The first analogy is sovereign immunity. The second 
analogous situation is the Court’s treatment of Section 1983 cases. The third 
analogous situation is the Court’s use of the doctrine of preemption. The 
fourth analogous situation involves treaty abrogation by later enacted stat-
utes. While the Court has never expressly required an affirmative showing 
of congressional intent, analogous Supreme Court doctrines show that this 
approach would not be out of keeping with Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
a) Sovereign Immunity Requires Actual Intent.  The first example by 
analogy to a requirement that Congress itself manifest a clear statement to 
the effect that it desires a cause of action has been that of statutes which 
allege to remove sovereign immunity from the states or the federal govern-
ment.
332
 In this situation, the Supreme Court requires a specific mandate 
from Congress to override the traditional presumption in favor of sovereign 
immunity to the states,333 at least where Congress invokes its traditionally 
exercised powers such as the Commerce Clause.334 While the rationales for 
this approach are somewhat distinct from those of implied causes of ac-
tion,335 the overriding goals in both result in strikingly similar ends.336 It is 
an entirely unremarkable thing to ask the Supreme Court to insist on ex-
press congressional intent through someone from Congress actually voicing 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (holding that the reliance by the public on the interpreta-
tion of the Court is a valid reason to be cautious in the Court’s decision on whether to overrule a previ-
ous decision).  
331
 Use of analogy when determining implied causes of action is not rare. See Lampf, 501 U.S. at 
356 (holding that borrowing of a federal statute of limitations for federal implied causes of action are 
effective “only ‘when a rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy than [found 
elsewhere] . . .’ ”).  
332
 E.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991). 
333
 Tenn. v. Lane, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 1985 (2004) (holding that the threshold question in determining 
whether Congress has abrogated the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, is “whether Congress 
unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate that immunity . . . ”). 
334
 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464 (noting that “inasmuch as this Court . . . has left primarily to the 
political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise”); Lane v. Pena, 518 
U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (“A statute's legislative history cannot supply a waiver that does not appear clearly 
in any statutory text; ‘the unequivocal expression of elimination of sovereign immunity that we insist 
upon is an expression in statutory text.’”). 
335
 Defenders of the clear statement doctrine for sovereign immunity have traditionally articulated 
the requirement as a protection of the States’ Tenth and Eleventh Amendment powers. See Willscher, 
supra note 124, at 268. 
336
 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 469 (noting that “it is incumbent upon the federal courts to be certain of 
Congress’s intent before finding that federal law overrides this balance”).  
2006] A New Test for Congressional Intent Under Cort v. Ash 285
his concern on the issue. Such a requirement is common in other doctrines 
involving the interpretation of statutes passed by the Legislative Branch. 
b) Denial of Section 1983 Requires Explicit Congressional Action.
The second analogous situation is that of the famous civil rights statute, 
Section 1983.337 This statute, which allows for a cause of action for any 
person who, under color of state action, is deprived of rights granted by the 
“Constitution and laws,”338 has been confused at times with the analysis of 
implied causes of action because of the similar analysis is entitled to a 
cause of action.339 It remains clear, however, that sharp distinctions remain 
between the use of Section 1983 and implied rights of action, such as the 
fact that Section 1983 is, by statute, limited to federal statutory violations 
by state actors or those loosely tied to the State340 and therefore less separa-
tion of powers concerns abound.341
While there may be limitations on the uses of Section 1983, the Su-
preme Court has seemingly taken the issue of Section 1983 and allowed a 
cause of action under any federal statute for a violation if that statute 
granted a class of citizens some right unless Congress expressly or impli-
edly denied Section 1983 in the violated statute.342 This is different from an 
implied cause of action where the Court will assume that the statute does 
not grant a cause of action unless the Court finds Congressional intent to 
grant that cause of action.343 Additionally, both approaches examine the 
federal statute to see if it grants rights.344 It is unclear to what extent more 
recent cases have limited or adjusted this analysis,345 but it is clear that the 
analyses are sufficiently similar that it would not be surprising if scholars 
337
 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). 
338
 The relevant text of the statute reads: 
Every person who, under the color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and law, shall be liable to the party 
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.  
42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
339
 Jett, 491 U.S. at 712-13 (disputing Justice Brennan’s notion that a § 1983 cause of action 
should be examined through a Cort analysis); see also Harner, supra note 92, at 937 (noting that “the 
standards for section 1983 enforcement and the implication of private rights of action are sufficiently 
similar to have produced substantial scholarly criticism and considerable confusion in the lower federal 
courts”). 
340
 Stabile, supra note 18, at 872 (noting that “the only difference is in who has committed the 
statutory violation”); see also Harner, supra note 92, at 937. 
341
 Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 n.9. 
342
 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). 
343
 Harner, supra note 92, at 937. 
344
 Id.
345
 Boyer, supra note 19, at 763 (arguing that two later cases made the 1983 inquiry coextensive 
with the Court’s implied rights analysis). 
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and courts occasionally combined the two.346 It is therefore not an unheard 
of criticism that the Supreme Court itself has occasionally confused this 
very issue.347 Scholars have pointed out that the wise plaintiff’s lawyer, if 
forced to engage in either an implied cause of action theory or a Section 
1983 theory as a primary claim, would do well to argue both.348
Logically, Section 1983 causes of action and implied causes of action 
are sufficiently analogous; some would say flip sides of the same coin. 
Hence, it is notable that when a Section 1983 cause of action is contested 
based on legislative intent, the Supreme Court generally requires that the 
intent to deny a cause of action to be made clearly and expressly.349 It seems 
consistent, therefore, that the implication doctrine equally and oppositely 
requires that Congress clearly state its intent to create a cause of action.350
Implication cases involve a textualist argument that the plain meaning of 
the statute should be read against the implied cause of action.351 In a similar 
vein, the Supreme Court has taken the position that the term “laws” in sec-
tion 1983 should be read plainly to include all statutes passed by Con-
gress.352
c) Preemption also Requires Actual Intent.  The third analogous 
situation to the proposed congressional intent doctrine is the preemption 
doctrine. Preemption generally requires actual congressional intent in the 
federal statute for the statute to wholly occupy an area of law traditionally 
relegated to state law.353 This is because a statute that preempts state law on 
the issue leads to a situation where Congress appears to have stricken the 
state laws on the issue. The result is an individual left with recourse under 
federal law or no remedy at all. The idea that preemption of state law re-
quires actual congressional intent on the issue is similar to the implication 
doctrine offered which equally requires actual Congressional intent that 
346
 Davant, supra note 50, at 626 (“Although the Sandoval Court’s holding is limited to a particu-
lar kind of federal right—limited rights of action—its reasoning and language could have broader impli-
cations.”). 
347
 As an example, Donald H. Zeigler argues that the Court did just that: “In the guise of deciding 
whether the statute conferred a right and whether the private remedy the plaintiff sought was foreclosed 
by a comprehensive remedial scheme, the Court essentially performed a Cort v. Ash analysis.” Zeigler, 
supra note 18, at 112; see also Key, supra note 19, at 330-32 (accord). 
348
 See id. at 302. 
349
 Harner, supra note 92, at 938. 
350
 One could make the argument that the rationale for allowance of causes of action under section 
1983 and denial under the theory of implication is a result of the fact that section 1983 cases in the least 
have a federal statute upon which the ultimate cause of action can claim some justification against issues 
of separation of powers; however, such claims and criticisms are beyond the scope of this Comment.  
351
 See note 273 and accompanying text for arguments based on textualism. 
352
 Key, supra note 19, at 308 (noting that the textualist theory is the most plausible of the alterna-
tive theories on the meaning of the term “law”). 
353
 Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984); Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 
2488, 2495-96 (2004). 
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Congress expected a cause of action to exist under the statute. As the Court 
noted in Kerr-McGee, legislative silence “takes on added significance in 
light of Congress’s failure to provide any federal remedy for persons in-
jured by such conduct. It is difficult to believe that Congress would, without 
comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal 
conduct.”354
It should be therefore equally difficult to believe that Congress, with-
out comment, would expect a statute to contain a cause of action without 
any explanation as to the breadth or depth of that potential litigation. Thus 
in preemption cases, the Supreme Court insists that Congress itself show a 
clear statement to the effect that it wishes to engage in questions of federal-
ism by taking some issue away from state control.355 The Court should 
similarly require actual congressional intent before the Court attempts to 
engage in questions of separation of powers. The Court should require 
Congress to expand the judicial power through a showing of clear intent to 
grant a federal cause of action.  
d) Certain Treaties Mandate Actual Congressional Intent to Over-
turn.  The fourth analogous situation to the proposed actual congressional 
intent standard is that of the requirement of clear evidence that Congress 
intended to abrogate a treaty with an Indian tribe. Here the Supreme Court 
requires that “there must be clear evidence that Congress actually consid-
ered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian 
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating 
the treaty.”356 Instead, the Court requires that Congress consider the issue 
and will not disregard the treaty if the statute abrogates treaty rights in “a 
backhanded way.”357
The rationale (though not the test) is unique amongst constitutional 
doctrines.358 Yet it remains clear that the Supreme Court in these cases re-
quires a clear intent from Congress before it will allow the congressionally 
approved action to occur. This is the same test offered here towards impli-
cation cases: the Court will insist on a clear statement from Congress before 
implying into the statute that a cause of action should exist. 
D.    The Actual Congressional Intent Requirement in Action 
A final question naturally exists. Assuming that implication requires 
some form of actual legislative intent, the question becomes how much 
354
 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.  
355
 In Silkwood, the issue to be removed from state control was that of nuclear maintenance. Id. at
251. 
356
 Minn. v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 202 (1999).  
357
 United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986).  
358
 Id. (noting that “Indian treaty rights are too fundamental to be easily cast aside”).  
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actual intent needs to be established before the Court can legitimately find a 
private remedy. A calibrated answer to this question can exist only if one 
contemplates the stages or phases of potential legislative intent to determine 
the cut-off. 
1.    Traditional Notions of Statutory Construction 
The easy case is when the statute itself contains a cause of action.359
The Supreme Court can find intent in such a case by examination of the 
statutory language.360 When Congress legislates a cause of action into exis-
tence,
 361
 or specifically legislates that a cause of action shall not exist,362 it 
works with the Court to maintain easy distinctions of separation of pow-
ers.
363
More difficult is when the statute contains an administrative remedy or 
other causes of action but no private cause of action on point.364 On this, the 
359
 Contu, 450 U.S. at 770 (stating that “. . . on its face, the Act is a minimum wage law . . . ”). Cf
Lampf, 501 U.S. at 361 (holding that the statute, by specifically refusing to limit individuals bringing an 
implied cause of action in any way, expressed an intent to allow for broader implied causes of action). 
360
 Suter, 503 U.S, at 358 (holding that “the terms of [the statute] are clear . . . ”).  
361
 E.g., Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 907(h) (1927) (“The 
employer shall, however, have a cause of action against such third party . . . ”); 50 USCS § 1810 (1978) 
(“An aggrieved person . . . who has been subjected to an electronic surveillance . . . violation of section 
109 . . . shall have a cause of action against any person who committed such violation . . . .”); 50 USCS 
§ 1828 (1978) (“An aggrieved person . . . whose premises, property, information, or material has been 
subjected to a physical search . . . in violation of section 307 . . . shall have a cause of action against any 
person who committed such violation . . . .”).  
362
 E.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 2511 (2)(B) (1968) (“No cause of action shall lie in any court against any 
provider of wire or electronic communication service . . . for providing information, facilities, or assis-
tance in accordance with the terms of a court order, statutory authorization, or certification under this 
chapter . . . .”); 18 U.S.C.S. § 2703 (e) (1986) (stating that no cause of action shall lie “against a pro-
vider disclosing information under this chapter.”); 42 U.S.C.S. § 9604 (j) (1980) (“There shall be no 
cause of action to compel the President to acquire any interest in real property under this Act.”); see also 
Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at 91 (finding that the statutes did not expressly create a right of action). 
The art of express congressional denial has not been lost. Congress displayed its ability to limit certain 
implied rights of action even while creating the Homeland Security Act. See 6 U.S.C.S § 236 (f) (2003) 
(“Nothing in this section shall be construed to create or authorize a private right of action to challenge a 
decision of a consular officer or other United States official or employee to grant or deny a visa.”). 
363
 See, e.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568 (deciding that “as with any case involving the interpre-
tation of a statute, our analysis must begin with the language of the statute itself”); Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. 
at 174 (accord); Kaufman, supra note 4, at 189 (arguing “when Congress legislates in favor of a class of 
private plaintiffs seeking relief . . . the Supreme Court ensures the wall of separation of powers remains 
‘high’”). 
364
 E.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 569-71 (holding that the statute created an administrative rem-
edy in the Securities and Exchange Commission and therefore did not also create a private remedy); 
Guardians, 463 U.S. 582 (holding that the statute creating an administrative remedy to a Title VI Civil 
Rights violation precluded a private right of action); Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 531-32 (holding that the 
statute, by expressly leaving enforcement to the administrative agency, therefore denied a private cause 
of action); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 288 (stating that the statute’s “express means of enforcement”—i.e., 
agencies—precluded the notion that a private enforcement action was contemplated; see also Lampf,
501 U.S. at 359 (“When, the statute of origin contains comparable express remedial provisions, the 
inquiry usually should be at an end.”).  
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Supreme Court has generally held that inclusion of the alternative remedies 
necessarily excludes congressional intent to provide a private remedy.365 At 
least part of the reason for this approach is the maxim: “expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius,”366 although this has not been the explicit rationale.367
Further on this line, however, the Court has noted that if the administrative 
remedy is insufficient based on agency refusal to enforce the law or agency 
inability based on insufficient funds to enforce the law, the question of in-
tent can be found if other indications of intent can be found to support im-
plication.368
This line appears to be illogical if the true concern of the Court is 
whether intent really exists. It would be nonsensical to tie the amount of 
money allocated in the federal budget to an agency to the determination of 
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.369 After all, if 
the agency is under-funded or simply refuses to engage in enforcement,370
the problem is not with congressional intent on whether private enforce-
ment should occur, but rather with Congress itself for failing either to pro-
vide adequate funds for enforcement of required actions or to force the 
agency to enforce the law nevertheless.  
When Congress passes a statute with language previously used as a 
term of art by the Supreme Court,371 congressional intent may appear sim-
ply by looking at the statute.372 This is because Congress, by using language 
365
 T.I.M.E. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464 (1959) (noting that the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 
granted rate regulation of motor carriers exclusively to the Interstate Commerce Commission as provid-
ing a statutory scheme in which courts have no right to adjudicate such an issue). But see Merrill Lynch,
456 U.S. at 384-85 (holding that the inclusion of a regulatory remedy did not necessarily exclude judi-
cial remedies since both went to the goal of self-regulation); see also Doe v. Chao, 124 S. Ct. 1204, 
1212 (2004) (holding that the statutory minimum of $1,000 in damages found in the Privacy Act of 1974
precluded recovery when physical damages were less than the statutory minimum). 
366
 “The expression of one or more things of a class implies the exclusion of all not expressed.” 
Stow v. Summit County, 590 N.E.2d 1363, 1364 (Ohio 3d Cir. 1990).  
367
 Sagers, supra note 19, at 1391. While not explicitly held, the Supreme Court has, on occasion, 
all but accepted this rationale. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 533 (holding that “it is also an ‘elemental canon’ 
of statutory construction that where a statute expressly provides a remedy, courts must be especially 
reluctant to provide additional remedies”). 
368
 See generally Boyer, supra note 19, at 743 (“When a court finds that a remedial scheme is 
poorly defined and inadequate to address the needs of a plaintiff, contradictory conclusions regarding 
congressional intent can be drawn from a silence that is at best ambiguous.”). 
369
 But see Stabile, supra note 18, at 883 (arguing that agencies generally have lump sum budgets 
and little congressional direction on which statute to enforce with the most vigor). 
370
 Sagers, supra note 19, at 1398 (arguing for an implied cause of action for the Real Estate 
Settlement Procedures Act in part because the agency to which its enforcement was entrusted, HUD, 
“apparently has no interest in enforcing section 10”). 
371
 See supra note 287 and accompanying text on term of art contextualism. 
372
 See, e.g., Thompson, 484 U.S. 182 (relying in part on context); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286 (hold-
ing that “[t]he statute was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” and therefore should 
be treated the same way). Cf. Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 534 (holding that “there exists no equivalent to 
[the statute] which permits judicial enforcement of [a private cause of action]”). 
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already given a certain meaning by the Court, arguably was justified to ex-
pect that the language would have a similar interpretation.373
Similar to this logic, a statute that is amended by Congress that pro-
vides for more favorable language374 should be perceived as creating the 
necessary intent to be interpreted under the second Cort factor.375 The Su-
preme Court has not consistently stated whether this would constitute ade-
quate intent.376 This situation constitutes valid indication of intent nonethe-
less because by amending the statute to be more amenable to implication 
concerns, Congress implicitly intended that cause of action to exist.377 Such 
logic would not extend to interpreting a form of congressional intent into a 
statute where Congress chose not to amend the statute.378
2.    Using Actual Intent 
If the statute itself is silent and lends no direct inference on intent, how 
much intent should the Supreme Court require in the history of the legisla-
tion?379 As the Supreme Court in Touche Ross pointed out, “implying a pri-
373 Cannon, 441 U.S. at 699 (noting that between 1964 and 1972, federal courts and the Supreme 
Court consistently found implied causes of action in similar situations as the one at issue). 
 This is not to be confused with the contextualist view on interpretation as the contextualist ap-
proach argues not that the language is given the value of a term of art, but rather that the language, given 
a certain interpretation, is left untouched by later Congresses. See notes 269-79 and accompanying text 
on contextualism.  
374 For instance, an amendment that adds language providing a class certain rights or providing a 
congressional purpose to remedy some violation of the statute. A similar result exists when a proposed 
statute is amended in committee to more directly address legislative intent. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2751 
(pointing out that an early House Committee draft of a statute that was “. . . then revised, at the sugges-
tion of the Attorney General . . . codified Congress’s unwilling[ness] to subject the United States to 
liabilities depending upon the laws of a foreign power”) (internal quotations omitted). 
375
 E.g., Merrill Lynch, 353 U.S. at 384 (relying in part on a 1974 congressional amendment de-
signed to strengthen regulation of futures trading). Daily, 464 U.S. at 537-38 (relying in part on amend-
ments passed by Congress to a statute while also relying on the rejection of Congress of other amend-
ments to the statute which would allow an investment company to bring an implied cause of action); 
Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 816-17 (holding that Congress passed amendments to 
the statute that “appeared to endorse” the implied cause of action). See generally Carlson, 446 U.S. at 
19-20 (relying in part on congressional comments accompanying an amendment). C.f. Contu, 450 U.S. 
at 775-76 (noting the legislative history of an amendment to the statute creating an administrative right 
in lieu of a private right of action). 
376
 See Stabile, supra note 18, at 892 (“The Supreme Court has not been consistent in its accep-
tance of this theory of adoption, or acquiescence, by silence.”). 
377
 See Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1844 (holding that “Congress routinely creates new rights of action by 
amending existing statutes, and altering statutory definitions or adding new definitions of terms previ-
ously undefined, as a common way of amending statutes”). This is not quite the same as “term of art 
contextualism,” however, as the improving language still requires an affirmative act by Congress to 
create the cause of action. Simply put, not just any amendment will do to create the requisite intent. 
378
 Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 187 (holding that “[the Court has] stated, however, that failed legisla-
tive proposals are a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of a prior statute”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
379
 E.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571 (finding the legislative history of the statute “entirely silent 
on the question of whether a private right of action for damages should or should not be available . . . ”). 
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vate right of action on the basis of congressional silence is a hazardous en-
terprise, at best.”380 This is because “Congress, for reasons of its own, all 
too frequently elects to remain silent on the private right-of action ques-
tion.”381 As a result, when the Supreme Court begins the questionable proc-
ess of implying a cause of action in the face of congressional silence, the 
Court inevitably multiplies the problem by attempting to interpret congres-
sional intent on additional issues such as the appropriate statute of limita-
tions that Congress intended to give that implied action when it is unclear 
that Congress ever even expected the underlying action to exist in the first 
place.382 This is exactly the purpose of what this Comment calls the “actual 
intent” standard. Under this standard, the Court’s examination of intent be-
gins and ends with a question of whether Congress actually considered the 
issue of whether a cause of action should exist. This is arguably both a more 
and less stringent standard than the one currently used. The forms of poten-
tial legislative intent show how the Court would decide under this new pro-
posed standard. 
The first situation is where Congressional debates occurred on the 
floor of both Houses passing the statute.383 In this situation, the statute 
would clearly meet the actual intent standard. Logically, a single Member 
of each House on the respective congressional floors could raise the issue. 
This is because that single Member, by raising the issue, arguably made 
Congress aware of the possibility of implication in that case.384
Less clear is the scenario where the debate occurs on the floor of only 
one House of Congress. This has been enough in some circumstances.385
While this approach is less direct, the Supreme Court should find Congres-
sional intent in this situation. The statute’s history, having been subjected to 
debate on this issue in at least one House, means that legislators have con-
380
 Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571. But see Musick, 508 U.S. at 295 (“Inquiring about what a given 
Congress might have done, though not a promising venture as a general proposition, does in this case 
yield an answer we find convincing.”). 
381
 Guardians, 463 U.S. at 608. 
382
 Lampf, 501 U.S. at 359. 
383
 E.g., Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 571 n.11 (relying in part on both House and Senate records of 
floor debates). 
384
 But see Gen. Dynamics, 124 S. Ct. at 1248 (holding that “even the contemporaneous remarks 
of a single legislator who sponsors a bill are not controlling in analyzing legislative history”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
It should be noted that the question of whether the Congressional member who brought up the pos-
sibility ultimately voted for the statute should be immaterial for similar reasons. 
385
 See, e.g., Contu, 450 U.S. at 774 (relying on a speech by Representative Bacon in examining 
congressional intent); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182 n.3 (relying in part on statements of Senators Duren-
berger and Wallop in examining congressional intent); see also Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 20-21 (declining 
to find enough congressional intent in a statute where “Senator Stafford stated on the Senate floor that . . 
. [the law was designed to grant a protection of rights because the Senator] . . . spoke merely in terms of 
‘assisting’ the States”); see also id. at 21 (relying in part on Senators Randolph’s and Javits’s position as 
to whether the statute created a private cause of action or merely acted as an assistance program). 
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sidered the issue and an intent has formed on the issue by ultimately pass-
ing the law. While some would criticize this approach based on concerns of 
bi-cameralism,386 what the Court would be doing here is less like a single 
House veto, and more like a single House addition, without which the stat-
ute would arguably not have been passed in at least one House and there-
fore never passed into law.  
A third relatively clear scenario is when congressional members in the 
committee from which the bill came voice their opinions during committee 
meetings.387 This refers specifically to speeches, comments, and concerns 
made by members of Congress while in committee debating and deciding 
the merits of the proposed legislation.388 This is yet a more difficult case to 
discern legislative intent from because the entire House of one House is 
simply not present when the committee raised these concerns. However, 
under the proposed standard of actual intent, committee members’ views 
should count towards legislative intent for purposes of Cort.
The reason for this is twofold. First, because a congressional member 
brought the issue up it would simply be consistent to count this intent as 
actual legislative intent.389 Indeed, if the intent of a Congressional member 
does not count towards actual legislative intent, then the entire enterprise is 
arguably a misnomer. Second, congressional members generally self-select 
themselves to sit on various committees. They do so for a variety of rea-
sons, from political gain to expertise on a particular area. It cannot and 
should not be the position of the Supreme Court, however, to discount the 
concerns of a Congressman because they chose to sit on a committee on 
which they may have particularized knowledge of the subject matter. The 
Court rather should give equal weight to committee members’ views be-
cause of their insight on how the best and brightest of Congress on the issue 
believed that the issue should be decided. 
Another potential situation would be that of spoken congressional 
member’s thoughts on an unpassed version of the same Act.390 Under this 
situation, the expressed concerns of the congressional member should count 
as evidence towards legislative intent, but weighed less heavily than other 
forms of intent. Legislative intent admittedly exists. The actual statute, 
386
 See Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (Court overruling a statute premised on a single house veto).  
387
 E.g., Merrill Lynch, 353 U.S. at 383 n.71 (relying in part on Representative Thorn’s com-
ments); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 574 n.15 (relying in part on Senator Fletcher’s comments). 
388
 See id. at 571 n.11 (relying in part on the record of the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce Committee). 
389
 See generally Thompson, 484 U.S. at 518 n.3 (relying on the statements of Senators Durenber-
ger and Wallop in committee). 
390
 E.g., Guardians, 463 U.S. at 600 (relying in part on the unsuccessful attempt to amend Title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to ease private rights of action); see also Thompson, 484 U.S. at 183-85 
(noting the congressional debate between two competing legislative proposals and finding that the 
rejection of one of them led to insight into the congressional intent of the other). 
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however, can rebut that intent if that statute has changed in some way. Thus, 
the intent of the Congress may have remained unexpressed overtly by the 
new statute, yet the Supreme Court may find congressional intent by an 
examination of Congress’s concerns about the previous statute.391
Other forms of potential congressional intent would simply not be 
enough. For example, legislative history offered after passage of the act is 
simply invalid.392 This is because the act, once passed by Congress and 
signed by the President, must stand or fall based on the language and intent 
expressly creating it. If a Congress in the future could create a legislative 
past, the process of passing statutes would amount to a system where the 
law means simply what the majority of the present Congress thinks it 
means.
393
 The Supreme Court therefore must give post-act legislative his-
tory little, if any, weight in the consideration of the second Cort factor. 
Similar to this is legislative history in other, similar acts.394 While 
some critics would argue that under this proposed standard of actual intent, 
the Supreme Court should give that history similar weight to that of the 
intent of similar but unpassed statutes, this would be an incorrect method of 
discerning actual legislative intent. There would be two reasons that this 
approach would be invalid. First, the legislative history of a passed statute 
is logically different from that of the history of an unpassed statute in that 
the history generally must remain close to the passed legislation. It is diffi-
cult enough for the legislative history of a passed statute to explain the in-
tent of that statute, let alone the intent of other laws in the federal code. 
Second, the Supreme Court itself has generally rejected this method of in-
terpretation as being too indecisive.395 The question of whether to carry 
over the intent behind a similar statute to the statute at issue should be an-
swered in the negative under the idea of “actual legislative intent.” 
A comparable result should occur when the Supreme Court examines 
the legislative history of evidence provided in the committee.396 When a 
391
 The question of whether a great mass of such concerns would be enough to overcome some 
other more weighted form of legislative intent is beyond the scope of this Comment, however, and is too 
remote to merit much concern.  
392
 Contu, 450 U.S. at 778 (holding that “the views of this later Congress [cannot] be treated as 
determinative of the question whether the Act’s drafters intended to preclude [a private right of ac-
tion]”). 
393
 See Scalia, supra note 209, at 22 (disputing the notion that “the law means what it ought to 
mean”). 
394
 See Chao, 124 S. Ct. at 1212 (holding that “subsequent legislative history [found in a different 
statute] will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from its language 
and legislative history prior to its enactment”). 
395
 Lambert, supra note 92, at 1239. 
396
 E.g., Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182 (examining the testimony of Acting Deputy Attorney General 
Michel and a letter from Assistant Attorney General Patricia Wald to Representative Peter Rodino in 
interpreting whether the statute creates an implied cause of action); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 574 n.15 
(examining the testimony of Richard Whitney, President of the New York Stock Exchange, before the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency).  
151
294 FIU Law Review    [1:239 
congressional committee decides whether a bill should go before the floor, 
the committee usually receives testimony as well as other forms of evidence 
by citizens and specialists on the issue.397 While commendable that Con-
gress examines this extraneous information before making its decision, the 
Supreme Court should deny this the force of congressional intent. One rea-
son is that evidence taken by committee may conflict and therefore create 
inconsistency in use of some evidence for purposes of congressional in-
tent.
398
 Another reason is that under the proposed standard of “actual in-
tent,” this information is simply not the expressed views of Congress or its 
members on the issue.  
On first impression, this may appear similar to that of the presumption 
made previously that a single member of Congress’s views should count 
towards legislative intent. Examined more carefully, however, this approach 
neglects the fact that this situation requires a triple presumption. The first 
presumption is that the committee receiving the evidence can constitute 
Congressional intent. The second presumption is that the committee re-
ceived entirely consistent evidence which was uncontradicted through the 
hearing. The third presumption must suppose that the committee, upon re-
ceiving the evidence, ultimately had that evidence in mind when making 
their recommendation. While one presumption may ultimately be helpful, 
multiple presumptions obviously become problematic. 
The final potential source of legislative history is that of the narratives 
of the committee report.399 Under the proposed system of “actual legislative 
intent,” this source is inherently flawed and should receive no value in dis-
cerning the second Cort factor. The reason for this is that it is unclear that 
Congress itself, or even the congressional committee that created the report, 
397
 E.g., Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 383 (relying on the testimony of the Commodities Exchange 
representatives given to the House Committee on Agriculture in concluding that Congress intended a 
private right of action to exist); Thompson, 484 U.S. at 181-82 (relying heavily on the testimony of 
Acting Deputy Attorney General Michel). Some cases have gone even further than testimony. Daily, 464 
U.S. at 537 (relying in part on a report commissioned by the SEC to hold that Congress intended a right 
of action). 
398
 Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1991 n.16 (showing a disagreement between the majority and dissent as to 
whether certain “evidence” taken by the congressional committee on whether to pass the Americans 
with Disabilities Act was valid evidence regarding state abuses or immaterial evidence addressing non-
state actors). 
399
 See Contu, 450 U.S. at 773-74 (relying in part on the House Committee on Education and 
Labor Report of the statute); Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 20 (relying in part on the House Committee report 
to find no cause of action); Jones, 124 S. Ct. at 1844 (using a House Report to determine “that Congress 
was keenly aware of the problems associated with the [Court’s approach in determining federal statutes 
of limitations]”); F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., 124 S. Ct. at 2369 (holding that the legislative history and 
reports of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act “suggest that Congress designed to clarify, 
perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act’s scope as applied to foreign 
commerce”). See generally Suter, 503 U.S. at 361 n.15 (finding legislative history found in the Report 
of the Senate Committee on Finance “relevant” to the inquiry of whether Congress intended a cause of 
action to exist). 
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has read or even thought about the contents of the report.400 This is because 
of a related concern, namely that congressional Members never write the 
committee reports.401 Instead, congressional staffers or lobbyists tradition-
ally accomplish this task.402 Under the proposed system of actual legislative 
intent, the Supreme Court should deny this non-congressional attempt at 
creating a legislative history to discern that Congress impliedly intended to 
create a cause of action. 
The result in this situation is admittedly similar to that of Justice 
Scalia’s distaste for committee reports.403 Nevertheless, if the committee 
report contains strictly the speeches and debates of congressional members 
and is devoid of narrative, the reports may have some evidentiary weight in 
determining congressional intent under the proposed standard.  
After examining all potential sources of congressional intent that could 
arguably result in a finding under the second Cort factor, it is important to 
note what should not play a role in that determination, namely the concern 
for floodgates.404 Admittedly, members on the Supreme Court have on oc-
casion considered the issue of floodgates as a concern that merits attention 
for purposes of implication.405 Scholars have voiced concerns as well.406
However, the Court should not base its decision on whether a cause of ac-
tion would result in more litigation for three reasons. 
The first reason is that the question of implication is a jurisdictional is-
sue. Implication cases require the court to consider whether the cause of 
action exists under the statute in which the Court grants subject matter ju-
risdiction.407 Thus, implication cases should not create the kind of floodgate 
concerns many worry about because whether to imply a cause of action, 
400
 See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text on committee reports. 
401
 Scalia, supra note 209, at 35.
402
 Id.
403
 Id. 
404
 See generally Toby J. Stern, Comment, Federal Judges and Fearing the “Floodgates of Litiga-
tion,” 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 377 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE 
AND REFORM 315 (1996): “[t]oday’s caseloads make it a question of some moment whether judges 
legitimately may consider caseload effects when deciding a case”).  
405
 Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377 (“The increased complexity of federal legislation and the in-
creased volume of federal litigation strongly supported the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of 
legislative intent than Rigsby had required.”); see also Lampf, 501 U.S. at 369 (arguing that “judicial 
economy” argued for a shorter statute of limitations for the implied cause of action); Vaca, supra note 
143, at 474-75 (“Undoubtedly, an important motivating factor in the Supreme Court’s expansion of [a 
federal arbitration statute] has been the Court’s attempt to reduce the case load on an overburdened 
federal court system.”).  
406
 Zeigler, supra note 18, at 138-41 (noting that “if federal courts may abstain entirely from 
hearing actions that Congress has explicitly directed them to hear, surely they may decline for pragmatic 
reasons to hear lawsuits that Congress has not explicitly authorized”) (internal footnotes omitted). But 
see Stern, supra note 403, at 378 (arguing that “in almost all situations, the fear of increased litigation is 
not a valid judicial argument”). 
407
 See supra note 4 on jurisdictional issues involving implication cases. 
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even if it must go to the Supreme Court, ultimately is decided before full 
litigation and discovery.408 The second reason that the Court should not 
worry about this issue is that this has not been a concern as of yet,409 nor 
does it logically follow that the creation of a host of implied causes of ac-
tion itself would result in a vast increase in cases brought to the federal 
courts.
410
 As Justice Powell noted in Cannon, the Supreme Court, since 
Cort has seemingly implied enough causes of action for most of the major 
pieces of legislation to have at least one cause of action in federal court.411
This does not even count the implied causes of action made by the Supreme 
Court since Cannon.412 A third reason for the Court to ignore the question 
of floodgates is that it would remove attention from the more important 
408
 Some additionally note that implied causes of action are generally brought along with other 
claims and therefore the dismissal of the implication claim would not appreciably decrease the federal 
workload. Sagers, supra note 19, at 1402-03. This theory, however, seems to conflict with the idea that 
implication cases are needed in order to ensure that the plaintiff receive some remedy at all.  
409
 Boyer, supra note 19, at 747 (explaining “if in fact the Court’s design is to limit the amount of 
litigation imposed on the already overburdened federal courts by enforcing only those remedies explic-
itly provided for by Congress, the continued profession of Cort’s vitality can only encourage protracted 
lawsuits by plaintiffs destined ultimately to be denied relief”). 
410
 See Kaufman, supra note 4, at 189-90 (pointing out that while an average of 2,358.5 securities 
and commodities actions where filed over a three year period, only an average of 123.5 were implication 
cases). This is far more striking when it is considered that over 283,688 cases went before federal dis-
trict courts in a comparable year. Stern, supra note 400, at 386. 
411
 At the time of Cannon, the implication of as many as 15 different federal statutes had already 
occurred by the courts. Local 714, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Greater Portland Transit Dist., 589 
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978) (implying a cause of action in section 13(c) of Urban Mass Transportation Act of 
1964); Bratton v. Shiffrin, 585 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1978) (implying a cause of action from section 1007(a) 
of Federal Aviation Act of 1958);  Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Employees v. Webb, 580 F.2d 496 (D.C. Cir. 
1978) (implying a cause of action from Section 203 of National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958);  
Riggle v. Cal., 577 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1978) (implying a cause of action under the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act); Davis v. Southeastern Cmty. Coll., 574 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1978) (implying a cause 
of action under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 
F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978) (implying a cause of action under Art. 28(1) of Warsaw Convention); Abraham-
son v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under Section 206 of Invest-
ment Advisors Act of 1940; Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 
F.2d 478 (6th Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under section 11(e) of Fed. Home Loan Bank Act); 
N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under Sec-
tions 16 and 21 of Glass-Steagall Act); Daniel v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 F.2d 1223 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(implying a cause of action under Section 17(a) of securities Act of 1933); United Handicapped Fed’n v. 
Andre, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under section 504 of Rehabilitation Act 
of 1973); Nedd v. U.S. Mine Workers, 556 F.2d 190 (3d Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under 
section 302 of Labor Management Relations Act, 1947); Kipperman v. Acad. Life Ins. Co., 554 F.2d 377 
(9th Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under 39 U. S. C. 3009); McDaniel v. Univ. of Chicago & 
Argonne, 548 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1977) (implying a cause of action under section 1 of Davis-Bacon Act), 
Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., 534 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1976) (implying a cause of action under 
section 6 of Securities Exchange Act of 1934).  
Two implication cases during that time involved the federal Court of Appeals finding a cause of ac-
tion only to be overturned by the Supreme Court: Touche Ross, 442 U.S. 560; Transamerica, 444 U.S. 
11. 
412
 See appendix. 
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concern, namely congressional intent behind the statute.413 Instead, an ex-
amination of floodgates would remove from the Court the one concern that 
creates the purpose of the examination of legislative intent, namely that of 
deference to Congressional choice.414
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the implication doctrine has undergone radical change 
from its common law ancestry. It has moved from towards a factorial ap-
proach and soon after to an approach which focuses on congressional intent. 
Nevertheless, while the rationale for implications has changed over the 
years, the question of how to interpret has remained elusive and lacking 
definition.  
It is hoped that this Comment has helped both to explain how the Su-
preme Court has performed in the past and how it might improve on its 
performance of the role of interpretive partner to Congress in the constitu-
tional order. Other doctrines exist to clarify and adjust the current implica-
tion doctrine, however, they remain impractical and provide more constitu-
tional problems than they appear to solve. A new approach that asks for an 
adoption of an actual intent standard, where the Supreme Court insists upon 
actual intent from Congress, would be in keeping with other doctrines, cur-
rent precedent, as well as consistent throughout the many potential forms of 
congressional intent. 
413
 See Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (complaining that the Supreme Court’s 
decision to deny extension of an implied cause of action would result in overruling “hundreds of judicial 
and administrative proceedings in every Circuit in the federal system . . . ”); see also Stern, supra note 
403, at 395 (arguing that the concern of floodgates “. . . is simply not considered in the Constitution and 
thus ruling on its basis should not be assumed to effectuate the purpose of the judiciary as delineated in 
Article III. As such, doing so violates the Constitution’s separation of powers”). 
414
 See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 717 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (pointing out that because it is better 
for Congress to specify its intentions, “for this very reason this Court in the future should be extremely 
reluctant to imply a cause of action absent such specificity on the part of the Legislative Branch”). 
153
